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13
Styles of Law and the
Attainment of Social
Justice

In the last chapter we focused on the meaning of legal autonomy and on the
constituent elements of the ideal type. We noted two requisites for the autonomous application of law: judicial formalism and equal competence. But we also
argued that the autonomous application of law does not guarantee that the law
as applied will not perpetuate or advance socioeconomic differences. For applied
law to be autonomous in this further sense, legal norms, in addition, must be
status neutral, and the distribution of welfare in society must be such that the
neutral norms do not disproportionately benefit some people. These latter requisites mean, in practice, that there must be substantial equality in the political,
social, and economic structures external to the legal system. If there is not, the
advantaged are likely to be able to use law to maintain or better their positions.
The norms of property law, for example, will perpetuate existing class distinctions, and through contract law disparities associated with unequal bargaining
power will penetrate the legal system.
The discussion of legal norms with which we concluded the previous chapter
is a good bridge to this one. Here we are first concerned with the law creation
process, the source of legal norms. In discussing law creation, our focus will
be on the legislature rather than on the courts or the executive branch, although
these latter actors can also make legal norms. We discuss at the outset the
possibility of legislative autonomy and suggest that at one level a legislature can
be partially autonomous but at another legislatures are inescapably oriented to
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the demands of nonlegal political, ethical, or social schemes. We next specify
four types of law that vary with social equality and overt attention to status.
Once we have specified the types of law, we consider how the law application
process interacts with the legislative types to define styles oflaw that characterize
legal relations in society. The basic concepts are developed at the level of ideal
types, but approximations to the types can be found in the real world. Throughout
this chapter issues of social justice are addressed, and in our conclusion we
discuss the implication of this chapter and the preceding one for the realization
of liberty and equality, the core components of justice from the Rawlsian perspective.

THE POSSIBILITY OF LEGISLATIVE AUTONOMY
The legislature sits at the intersection of the political and legal spheres. As we
saw in Chapter 10, it is open to the influence of wealth as well as to other sources
of social and political power and to the vociferous entreaties of those who support
private ethical systems. At the same time, the legislature is a crucial legal actor,
for it pours norms into the judicial and regulatory systems. It is fair to ask
whether a legislature can ever share the partial autonomy we have identified with
law. If not, the autonomy of law is likely to be of little import, for the stock of
legal forms and concepts that regulate and sanction behavior will soon reflect
the interests of powerful extralegal status groups. To note this is to suggest our
answer, for we have consistently and intentionally implied that the partial autonomy we see in the legal systems of the capitalist democracies reflects meaningful independence from extralegal sources of authority.
There are several reasons why some degree of legislative autonomy is possible. First, the structure of the legislature contributes to its ability to act autonomously. Interest groups can capture legislators, but it is difficult to generate a
coalition to capture the legislature. Thus the ready translation of the interests of
social, political, or ethical groups in ways that substantially threaten, rather than
simply fail to promote, the interests of others is difficult to achieve. In the United
States this difficulty is enhanced by constitutional requirements for super majorities when fundamental liberty interests or the independence of the courts is
directly threatened, and by the veto power given to the president.
Second, there are distinctively legal norms about the form, content, and
procedure of legislation that legislatures routinely honor. Some norms such as
the prohibition in the United States of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder
are written into a constitution. Others such as the need to respect the separate
jurisdictions of the judiciary and executive are implied by one. Still others such
as the preference for legislation that fits in as far as possible with the body of
existing law and the idea that legislation should be open to public comment are
part of the legislative culture. Adherence to such cultural rules not only promotes
autonomy in legislation, but is itself an important expression of autonomy.
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Third, in the United States by long-standing precedent and in other countries,
to differing degrees, the judiciary, the branch of government best insulated from
the pressures that threaten autonomy, has authority to void specific legislative
enactments.
Three further propositions are also important. First, although particular laws
may reflect the influence of identifiable status groups, the body of laws may mix
such a variety of concerns that the legal system can be identified with no particular
external interests, except possibly at the highest level of generality, such as
whites in a segregated society or the propertied in a class-stratified society.
Second, not all instances of externally oriented legislative behavior reflect the
influence of some special interest group. Recall Bohannan ( 1965). Some normslike much of the criminal law-are so generally accepted in society that the
legislative reinstitutionalization of these norms is not problematic. Third, it is
not necessarily the case that an autonomous legislature is likely to promote social
justice or that a legislature more accessible to special interests and extralegal
ethical systems is likely to decrease it. Often it is just the opposite.

LAW CREATION
But the fact that legislation is insulated to some extent from the pressures of
particular extralegal interests and is shaped to some extent by distinctively legal
concerns does not mean that legislatures are autonomous in the way courts are.
Even at the level of the ideal, there are fundamental differences. The formalist
court, as we saw in Chapter 12, takes legal norms as given and in this sense
can be entirely self-regarding 1 in disposing of cases. But a legislature must
ordinarily look beyond existing sources of law in deciding what new legal norms
will be. In doing so, it is almost always acting with a substantive end-as valued
in some extralegal social, political, or ethical order-in sight. This is true even
if that end is, for example, a regime of contract law that does not take into
account values other than the desirability of enforcing private agreements. The
creation of a status netural legal order can itself be a substantive goal.

LEGISLATIVE ENDOWMENTS
Laws specify the conditions under which the power of the state will be addressed
to certain ends. 2 These ends will, in practice, always be in some person's or
I. In the term "self-regarding" as we use it in this chapter, the legal system is the "self." Here
by self-regarding we mean that only the requirements of the law are attended to in deciding how a
dispute should be resolved. The implications of extralegal power and normative orders are not
considered.
2. These ends may specify specific goals directly as in laws designed to limit pollution, or they may
be more general as in much of tort law which has as its goal protecting people from the economic
aspects of harm caused by others, or as in much of contract law, the end of law may be to guarantee
arrangements specified by private parties.
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group's interest. Thus legislation, or lawmaking, increases the probability that
certain ends will be achieved because if they are not realized either the state
will enforce the law proactively, or the beneficiary of the legislation may call
on the courts, on the police, or on some other administrative agency to enforce
the law. In this sense law is said to "guarantee" behavior, and for this reason
we may think of a law as a kind of endowment. It endows actors with a power
to achieve their goals that they otherwise would not have. 3
Legislative endowments, that is, laws, vary in the extent to which they
acknowledge social differences and have a distributive end openly in view. Some
laws are on their face status neutral in that they create categories extracted from
all social context (e.g., the categories of citizen, defendant, property owner) and
give the same rights and duties to all who fit the category created. Other laws
take explicit account of social or economic positions and seek to allocate values
accordingly. Laws that are status neutral do not specify a particular distributive
goal to be achieved; that is, they do not on their face mandate actions that will
impose special costs on a preexisting class of organizations or individuals or
give special benefits to another such class. The distributive consequences of
status neutral laws are instead determined by the actions of individuals and
organizations and the ways these parties choose to invoke the law. Thus status
neutral laws often have the appearance of distributive neutrality and seem to be
motivated by an abstract evaluation of the kinds of rights and duties that will
allow communal life to flourish rather than by some conception of a desired end
state; or if there is a desired end state, the end, such as deterring homicide or
keeping traffic within a speed limit, will not be tied to or directed against the
interests of some discrete social group. Status neutral legal language is well
suited to judicial formalism and is apparently removed from redistributive concerns. We must, however, be cautious in taking the appearance for reality. Status
neutral laws are nonetheless purposive. Legislatures pass them to achieve certain
ends. The end may be the promotion of individual achievement or the enhancement of communal life in a status neutral fashion. Or it may be to create legal
rules that will allow one group or class to advance itself at the expense of another
group or class. In Chapter 12 we saw how the application of status neutral laws
in an unequal society could have this effect. A legislature enacting laws for such
a society presumably knows what neutral norms imply for the distribution of

3. The endowment may be less than what is promised or it may never have to be invoked. Legislative
endowments may be less than what is apparently promised because the administration or enforcement
of a law may be only partial, generally lax, or even subversive of the legislative intent. They may
never have to be invoked because the legislation may command behavior that would occur anyway
or the existence of the law may, without more, be sufficient to bring about the behavior ordered.
Yet except in the extreme cases where a law is clearly a dead letter or where no one would think
of doing otherwise, legislative endowments are real and consequential even if they do not fully
determine how the behavior they purport to deal with is ordered. In particular, we saw in Chapter
6 on negotiation that law may be vitally important to the resolution of disputes even if cases do not
officially enter the legal system (cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, 1979).
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welfare. Nevertheless, in examining legislation, it is helpful to treat status neutral
law as a distinct type.
The opposite type consists of laws that take social status specifically into
account and subordinate the ideals of legal neutrality and individual rights to the
attainment of particular ends. Laws of this type aim at specific end states that
usually involve some redistribution of welfare in society. Thus we shall call such
laws distributively oriented. Courts act consistently with the legislature's goals
if they interpret such laws with a close eye to the distributive goals the legislature
hoped to achieve. This requires a judiciary that is sensitive to the extralegal
values and interests that stimulated the legislation.
We can also distinguish two ways in which laws come to be enacted. At
the extremes powerful status groups may have effective control over the legislative process or those affected by the laws may be relatively equal in their
influence on what is enacted. In the former instance, legislation can be expected
to systematically advantage the most influential groups. In the latter, legislation
should ideally reflect some general consensus, but in practice, it is likely to
reflect shifting coalitions that temporarily gain control over the legislative process
to advance positions that they value. The process of building a coalition, however,
often tempers the gains of those who seek a particular law and cushions the
impact on those who will be disadvantaged by it. Thus where relatively equal
influence prevails there is frequently a distinction between what the groups that
most strongly support a law desire and what they get.
Keeping the concept of the legislative endowment in mind and cross-classifying
the types of law by equality of influence, we obtain the following fourfold table
(Table 13.1):
TABLE 13.1
law Creation and Legislative Endowments

Type of Law
The Law-Making Process

Status Neutral

Distributively
Oriented

(More or less) equal influence

Equally accessible
general endowments

Welfare-oriented
endowments

(3)

(Greatly) unequal influence

Differentially accessible
general endowments
(2)

(4)
Class-oriented
endowments
(1)

Distributively Oriented Endowments
Where dominant groups have inordinate control over the rule-making process,
and where the legislature is not bound in any way by a commitment to neutral
rules, we have the situation specified in cell 1. The organized power of the state
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is at the service of a particular class. Laws of this type are "instrumental" in
that they are instruments or tools used by socially dominant groups to achieve
their ends. Logical consistency if it is part of the legal culture is required only
with reference to self-defined interests, not with regard to some internal logic
of rules. Much of the law of slavery falls in this cell, as do those English laws
that facilitated the private exploitation of what had been publicly available pastures and American legislation that hampered the activities of trade unions. In
each case the dominant class bent the state to its will and so could proceed
legally to pursue its narrow class interests. Laws in this cell take explicit account
of the status differences of the affected parties and allocate values accordingly.
The dividing line between cell 1 and cell 4 is not discoverable by looking
at the law itself, for welfare-oriented endowments like class-oriented endowments
are purposive statutes that openly seek to advance specific subsets of social
interests. However, law in cell 1 is a powerful force for the preservation or
extension of existing inequalities, since it reinstitutionalizes the power of the
dominant class in the legal arena, while law in cell 4 seeks to advance the
common welfare4 and is potentially a means to increased social justice.
These differences reflect differences in political power; that is, in power to
influence the law-making process. In cell 1 in the ideal case a class or status
group clearly dominates, and it can make law without attending to the interests
of any other social group. The only restraints on how such powerful interests
use the legal system are the benevolent restraints of noblesse oblige and the
calculated restraints of self-interest. In cell 4 no one group can control the legal
process, so legislation will reflect either widely shared interests or the give-andtake needed to form winning coalitions. In the latter instance, laws will either
compromise the interests of various groups or be part of a package deal in which
interest groups support each other so that they will be supported in tum.
Instances of these three different processes are common. For example, laws
regulating pollution are in the perceived interest of so many people that the
vested interests in opposition have been unable to resist effectively much of what
has been attempted. Laws establishing determinate sentencing programs were
originally a compromise between liberals and conservatives who each had their
own reasons for wanting to discard a penal system oriented toward rehabilitation
and the system of indeterminate sentencing that went with it. The result in many
jurisdictions was a new, less flexible sentencing structure with average prison
terms that were longer than the liberals thought appropriate but shorter than the
conservatives wanted. Finally, the logrolling process that has congressman A

4. What we call welfare law, like the AFDC program, fits this cell, but the term welfare is used
more generally to refer to all kinds of redistributive legislation aimed at some vision of the common
good. Again, the line between cell I and cell 4 is blurred because a dominant minority can claim
that laws that further enhance their status are in the common good. However, at the extremes we
think the distinctions between cell I and cell 4 are clearly recognizable. They are also recognizable
if we focus on the process since in cell I unlike cell 4 a particular group or class consistently
dominates the legislative process and the law consistently reflects their domination.
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voting to support a shipyard in congressman B's district on the condition that B
vote to construct a dam for A's constituents is a familiar political phenomenon.
If perfectly equal influence, the situation that ideally characterizes cell 4
(and cell 3), in fact existed, social justice would not be problematic because
equal influence in the legislative process will not exist unless there is an equal
division of wealth, power, and privilege in the larger society. Law in such a
society would be in the common interest, for if it ceased to be, the condition of
equal influence that defines the pure type would disappear. In the real world, or
at least in the portion of the real world we call Western democracies, the influence
that different identifiable interests have on the legislative process is not equal,
but it is not so unequal that one group or class consistently dominates. To capture
this and to better relate our analysis to actual legal systems, we have relaxed
the defining condition for laws in cells 3 and 4 and have posited a society in
which individual welfare and influence on the law-making process are only ''more
or less" rather than absolutely equal. Given that some inequality persists in such
a society, it is not obvious why the interests of weaker groups occasionally
prevail, with justice, in the Rawlsian sense, being advanced by something like
the difference principle. Why, for example, do we have a large body of welfare
law that transfers money from the wealthier to the less well off? Why do not
the more powerful elements of society consistently form coalitions to advance
themselves at the expense of the least well off?
We do not propose to deal with these questions at length, but a word is in
order. There are several reasons why legislation may give special advantages to
groups that have little social power. First, the interests of stronger groups are
often antagonistic. If their power is closely balanced, weaker groups may be in
a position to strike a balance between them and, in exchange for their support,
they may be able to demand substantial benefits. The institutional requirements
for coalition building are crucial in determining the power that relatively weak
groups possess. Thus, in Israel, where the parliamentary system allows small
parties to flourish, extremely orthodox religious parties, whose support has been
needed to form a government, have been able to insist that some religious
practices they favor be imposed throughout the state. In the United States the
single member district system is death to third parties, but because large numbers
of otherwise powerless people participate in elections the dominant parties cannot
afford to ignore their interests entirely. Indeed, the Democratic party is, to a
large extent, organized around the expectation that they will get the vote of the
less well off, and legislation that the party passes when in office often responds
to the interests of this core constituency.
Other reasons welfare-oriented legislation often benefits the less well off
include the altruistic instincts of the powerful, self-interested judgments about
the cheapest way to keep the dominated under control and the fact that distinctions
between the weak and powerful are by no means clear-cut.
Altruism is a particularly powerful instinct when restated in an ideology that
demands certain actions. Thus the idea that humans were equal in the eyes of
God helped create the climate for a war that was in part about freeing slaves,
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and the idea, a century later, that humans were equal before the law led, as we
saw in Chapter 11, to a series of legal skirmishes that enhanced the social and
political power of those slaves' descendants. Pure self-interest may also lead
dominant coalitions to share benefits with less powerful groups. Sharing benefits
may be a cheap way to secure popular cooperation with laws that disproportionately aid those on top. Some would argue that the modem welfare state was
invented to prevent repetitions of the Russian revolution, and colonial regimes
typically reward some elements of the native population to keep other elements
under control. Sharing benefits is, of course, a strategy that may inform cell 1
type laws as well.
Finally, there may be important ties between members of more influential
and less influential groups that lead the former to support legislation in the latter's
interest. For example, future accident victims by virtue of being both unknown
and unorganized have little direct influence on the legislative process. Yet their
interests are well-represented when industries or insurance companies seek to
make tort recoveries less lucrative or more difficult to attain. This is because
personal injury lawyers, a quite influential group, realize that their financial
interests are inextricably linked with the rights accorded future victims. Perhaps
more to the point, even if the elderly were not a potentially powerful political
force, it would be difficult to cut back on the Social Security retirement program
because many of the more active and influential younger citizens who are children
of the elderly would feel obligated to support their parents if the state subsidy
were not available.
This litany of reasons why the interests of the relatively less influential are
likely to be advanced by welfare-oriented endowments when political influence
is divided more or less equally across individuals and groups should not mislead
one into thinking that in such a society it is better to have less influence than
more. The more powerful are likely to benefit disproportionately from the legislative process even if they cannot effectively bend the law into the specific
instrument of class domination that it is in cell 1. Special benefits to the more
powerful are endemic in modem capitalist democracies. Yet an important qualification must be added. The very features that cause a group to stand out as
influential can make its interests a natural target when other, individually less
influential groups, coalesce. Indeed, it may be the disproportionate influence of
a powerful group that stimulates the formation of more powerful counter coalitions. At the extreme the result will be a social revolution that strips the
previously most powerful single element of its power base. Less extreme but
more common is the mobilization of a coalition to pass a particular law when
an especially powerful element appears to be overreaching. Thus the railroads,
the most powerful of the nineteenth century industries, could not forestall the
popular movement for regulated freight rates that led to the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and the large trusts could not derail the perceived need for laws
attacking the monopolies that they spawned. However, in each instance the fate
of the enacted regulatory schemes reminds us of the tenacity of powerful organizations and the transience of many coalitions.

436

Distribution

A more or less equal distribution of legislative influence among actors and
social groups is also consistent with endowments that trample on the interests
of some weaker parties. Coalitions are formed that increase social injustice. For
much of this century a coalition of well-to-do and poor southern whites enforced
a system of segregation that disadvantaged the black population. American Indians and aliens in many countries have had to confront legislation that sought
to give portions of their wealth to more dominant groups. At some points in our
history there has been an overwhelming consensus supporting laws designed to
stifle political dissent. And even where legislative majorities have not oppressed
minorities, the interests of some groups, such as the interest that short people
have in avoiding discrimination, are almost entirely ignored. This then is the
dark side of cell 4. Although welfare-oriented legislation has the potential to
enhance justice by endowing weaker parties with state-supported entitlements,
it may also do the opposite. In particular, there is the danger that has been called
the "tyranny of the majority," a situation in which the dominant coalition
dismisses the interests and rides roughshod over the rights of those who are
collectively less powerful. The tyranny of the majority is particularly likely where
the same stable coalition dominates on many issues.
In any given society that is sufficiently egalitarian so that welfare-oriented
endowments are possible, the quality of the legislation that is enacted will tum
on the interests of identifiable groups, on their potential influence in the legislative
process, and on institutional arrangements that allow groups to link up or channel
the exercise of power. In short, it will tum on politics, for in cell 4 as in cell l
the way that law orders behavior is the realization of a political process; not
autonomous from it.

Status Neutral Endowments
The situation is somewhat different when we look at cells 2 and 3. Laws that
fit these cells are characterized by the appearance of status neutrality. They create
entitlements that are, in theory, open to all; impose duties that are, in theory,
binding on all; or establish conditions under which any private party can invoke
the power of the state in pursuit of personal ends. Some examples include the
rights that people have to use their private property as they see fit, the restraints
imposed on all by the criminal law, and the ability that contract law gives people
to hold others to their promises.
Status neutral laws attribute meaning to behavior based on the legal categories into which the behavior fits and not on the meaning it may have in the
larger society. Thus the destruction of draft board records to protest the arms
race is in law like throwing a rock through a school window for the hell of it.
Both are the malicious destruction of public property. The protestor who believes
he should be treated differently from the vandal will be told in a status neutral
system that the law perceives no essential difference in the two behaviors.
Similarly, a poor woman who agrees to sell her wedding ring for a quarter of
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its known value because she desperately needs money to feed her children will,
if she later tries to renege on the deal, be treated no differently from a wealthy
woman who agreed to sell a ring cheaply because she wanted to rid herself of
a reminder of her former husband and was indifferent to what she was paid.
The relevant legal categories do not attend to the social status of the contracting
parties or to the immediate motivations of specific agreements. Only certain
aspects of agreements are regarded by the law as important, and if these aspects
have the proper form, the law will proceed to enforce the agreement as if that
were all that mattered.
The problem with status neutral law from a social justice standpoint is, as
we saw in Chapter 12, that it treats people from all walks of life as if they are
equally well situated to comply with the law or to benefit from it. By not attending
to differences of power and status, it cannot correct for them. And by distributing
rights or responsibilities as if social status had nothing to do with their enjoyment
or burden, status neutral law in a substantially unequal society differentially
endows people with legal power or differentially exposes them to state regulation.
In a generally egalitarian society, status neutral law is more likely to enhance
mutual well-being and advance social justice. The law establishes conditions
under which individual action will be protected without specifying in detail the
direction those actions should take. Ordinarily this is liberty enhancing. People
know, for example, that their agreements will be enforced, but they are free to
agree on whatever suits them. Guarantees against overreaching derive not from
the law, but from the fact that power and status are equal to begin with. Rights
and obligations with respect to property cannot further entrench the power of
one group vis-a-vis another when preexisting disparities are absent.
Thus we see that the implications of formally neutral law for social justice
depend crucially on the distribution of power in nonlegal spheres. But this is
not the whole story. Law also affects that distribution. Where power is initially
distributed more or less equally but not perfectly so, status neutral law inhibits
planned social change that might wipe out vestiges of inequality. There are two
reasons for this. The first is that if the law does not recognize the way that
individuals are unequally situated it can neither compensate for inequalities nor
develop programs to obliterate them. The second is that status neutral law tends
to democratize the state's power, that is, to endow all the state's citizens more
or less equally with legal entitlements. This interferes with planned change both
by dispersing power rather than focusing it and by investing people with rights
that allow them to resist concerted efforts to reach egalitarian goals. Indeed, the
point is more general. In a more or less equal society people may have rights
protected by status neutral law that allow them to resist laws that the majority
of the moment thinks are in the common interest.
Where the distribution of power is markedly unequal to begin with, status
neutral law acts as a restraint on the dominant class. It must be general and tends
to be consistent across a wide body oflaw. Thus it is not a finely tuned instrument
designed to meet the specific, immediate needs of a powerful group. The advantage of status neutral law for the better off is that its entitlements are more
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accessible to the wealthy than to the poor, and the duties it imposes on the
wealthy are less onerous. However, it can cut against the interest of specific
members of the dominant class even if its tendency as a whole is to better their
positions. Rich murderers, for example, are occasionally hanged for their crimes,
and an ordinary homeowner who is sentimentally attached to his property may
thwart the plans of a wealthy developer.

REASONS FOR STATUS NEUTRALITY
Law that is not overtly purposive, is nonetheless passed with a purpose. We
can always ask of a law, in whose interest is it? If status neutral law imposes
limits on efforts to advance both the common good and the good of groups with
overwhelming political power, why do such laws ever get passed and why is
the common law, which is by and large a body of status neutral case law, not
overturned by legislation? Why, in other words, does not the majority of the
moment in a more or less equal society or the dominant group in a decidedly
unequal society limit their lawmaking to legislation that is aimed overtly at the
distributive ends they seek to achieve?
One reason has to do with culture and tradition; some values are taken for
granted even if they are not in an actor's immediate interest. It is probably
important that the common law is largely status neutral. Not only is the common
law at the core of Anglo-American legal education and thus important in shaping
the expectations that young lawyers have about law, but it also provides a context
into which new legislation must fit. 5
Here, however, we want to focus on another part of the explanation, for
status neutral law can be in the perceived interest of those who dominate the
political process. In a more or less equal society there will be no one group that
dominates. Instead, policy will be the product of temporary majorities and shifting coalitions. All groups are likely to be satisfied with the way some issues are
resolved and dissatisfied with the resolution of others. Influential groups may,
however, fear that the coalition structure will change to exclude their interests.
In particular, groups that do not dominate but have relatively more power and
influence at a particular moment may feel that their privileged status might lead
others to coalesce against them, and if so, they will be hopelessly outnumbered.
Status neutral law is a protection against the "tyranny of the majority" that
5. In the next section we discuss issues of judge made law. The common law is judge made. Some
of its norms seem to be judicial distillations of what was once popular or specialized (e.g., among
merchants) morality. An exploration of the origins of the common law is beyond the scope of this
book. Its general status neutrality may reflect ideals or requisites of judicial neutrality. Judges should
not legislate, and one way to avoid the appearance of legislating while making law is to suggest
that natural law, precedent or statutory law, mandates the particular decision and to present that
decision in language that is addressed to the general well-being of society rather than to the particular
ends of some status group. Also, it may be that the specialized and popular moral codes that have
been assimilated over the years into the common law are themselves status neutral.

Styles of Law and the Attainment of Social Justice

I

439

might otherwise result. Thus in a more or less equal society the coalition favoring
neutral solutions will often be dominant, and there will be a tendency to build
such solutions into constitutions, schemes of representation, and other institutions
that cannot be changed at the will of a temporarily dominant majority.
Status neutral law may also reflect the difficulties of planning for desired
ends. Extending rights to all in a more or less equal society means that the
effects of the law will reflect individual judgments and desires as mediated by
some approximation to a market. Not only might such an approach appear more
efficient than an attempt at detailed regulation, but it is also a way of compromising differences among groups that generally agree about how social life should
be regulated but disagree on the details.
In decidedly unequal societies there is another reason for status neutral law.
It tends to mask the exercise of power and obscure the degree to which law is
the servant of one class. This is important because the fact that one class clearly
dominates does not mean that control is not problematic. Maintaining control is
often difficult, expensive, and precarious. If the legal system is seen as a naked
tool by which one group rules others, it will be opposed by those hostile to the
group in power. If, however, the law is seen as rising above class differences,
it may be accorded respect and its commands may be taken for granted as right
(Hay, 1975).
We call this attitude toward law "legitimacy." The fact that a legal order
is regarded as legitimate does not necessarily mean that there will be compliance
when self-interest suggests that lawbreaking holds greater promise of reward.
But it does increase the probability of compliance and, more importantly, increases the probability that those whose self-interest is not obviously affected
by the law will cooperate with the lawmaker rather than with the lawbreaker.
As a result, legitimacy reduces the frequency with which legal commands must
be backed up with force.
It appears that laws which endow everyone with entitlements that only the
best off are likely to be in a position to enjoy and restrict everyone with prohibitions that are disproportionately likely to pinch the worst off are more likely
to be regarded as legitimate than laws that more openly enhance the position of
the best off or diminish the position of the worst. 6 Contrast, for example, your
reaction to a law that says "Jews and blacks may not join the Elite Country
Club" and a law that says "Private clubs are free to choose their own members."
The two laws may be equally effective in keeping Jews and blacks from joining
the Elite, but reactions to them, particularly on the part of "good thinking"
white Christians, will probably differ.
If you were intent on keeping the Elite a WASP organization, which law
6. This may well be contingent on the prevailing ideology. In a society where the ideals of freedom
and equality are regarded as important the textural argument is most likely to hold. In a highly
stratified society where the stratification is accepted as in the order of things, laws that openly distance
the dominant strata from the lower orders may be accepted by both the upper and lower strata as
legitimate.
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would you prefer? The choice is not completely clear, for you might find some
day that a less-bigoted clique had come to dominate the club. But formally
neutral law is likely to be less expensive to enforce since the Elite is less likely
to be attacked for bigotry, and it is likely to be more enduring since everyone,
including Jews and blacks, may see some advantage in laws that allow private
clubs to choose their own members. To generalize, the prospect of enhanced
legitimacy is, in many situations, likely to be sufficiently attractive to those who
dominate a legal order that status neutral law will be preferred to more openly
distributive enactments. Although the former is not so neatly tailored to the end
in view as the latter and some slippage may be inevitable, proceeding by neutral
rather than by clearly distributive rules may appear to offer greater prospects for
promoting class interests in the long run.

LAW APPLICATION
Now that we have considered four basic types of law and some reasons for these
approaches, we must consider how these types interact with the ways that law
may be applied. Thus we return to a topic that we discussed in detail in Chapter
12, but we examine it from a different perspective. First, we discuss senses in
which courts make law while applying it. Next, we contrast the substantively
oriented court with the formalist court we considered in Chapter 12. Finally, we
see what these judicial stances imply when courts apply laws of the types specified
in Table 13.1.

Judicial Lawmaking
In moving from lawmaking to law application, we shift our attention from
legislation to adjudication and from legislatures to courts. In doing so, we must
first address the fact that there are some senses in which courts make law. Courts
are directly responsible for the law of the case, which is the law as it applies
specifically to the litigating parties. When John Jones came to court charged
with burglary the law was that anyone who breaks into the dwelling of another
at night is guilty of burglary and may be punished by a prison term of from 1
to 10 years. When John Jones left court, a convicted felon, the law insofar as
it applied to John, was that he had broken into the dwelling of another at night
and as a consequence had to serve 3 years in prison. The situation is similar for
Susie Smith who was stopped at a red light when an Ajax moving van ploughed
into her. When Susie sued Ajax the law was that if Ajax's driver had not exercised
the care that might have been expected of a reasonable person and in consequence
had injured someone, Ajax would have to pay the injured person's damages.
When the lawsuit was concluded, the law, insofar as it concerned Susie and
Ajax, was that Ajax's driver had not, in fact, been exercising reasonable care
when his van struck Susie, and Ajax was obliged to pay her $126,000.
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Now this kind of lawmaking is inherent in any adjudicative process. Courts
cannot help but engage in it. Indeed, one of the features that distinguishes
adjudication from mediation is the adjudicator's ability to determine the law of
the case without seeking the parties' consent (McEwen & Maiman, 1984). Thus
if courts did not make law in this sense, they would not be adjudicating.
At the extreme, all that courts are doing when they make law in this way
is finding facts. John Jones either did or did not break into the dwelling of another
at night. If he did, he is guilty of burglary; if not, he is innocent. Once the facts
are determined, the implications of the law are self-evident. But almost invariably, applying the law to cases involves some interpretation. What, after all,
does it mean for a truck driver to exercise the care of a reasonable person? Is it
reasonable to look back at one's load after hearing a loud crash and so risk not
seeing a light tum red up ahead? Interpretive tasks like these are routine occurrences at trials (Stone, 1966).
Often, however, questions of interpretation rise that are easily extracted
from the facts of the case. If the court interpreting the law has the power to
pronounce rules that will guide other courts in similar cases, law in a more
extended sense may be created. Not only is the rule pronounced binding on the
parties to the case, but it is also binding on similarly situated parties in future
cases. It is a new rule to guide behavior. For example, suppose that John Jones
had just moved into a new subdivision in which all houses look alike. Coming
home late one night he turned into the wrong cul-de-sac and walked to the wrong
house. Frustrated at finding that his key did not work, he broke a window pane
and entered the house. He is charged with burglary.
To decide whether John is guilty of burglary is to decide whether the law
that criminalizes breaking into the dwelling of another person at night applies
when one reasonably believes he is breaking into his own house. However the
highest court in a jurisdiction resolves this issue, there will be a new rule of
general applicability. Either a good faith mistake will be a defense to the crime
of burglary or one breaks into a home he thinks is his own at his peril.
A court in this instance is clearly making law, and the type of rule it
enunciates is not very different from the kinds of rules that legislatures enact.
For example, had the legislature contemplated the case we describe, it might
have specifically provided that the burglary statute did not apply where the
proscribed actions were the result of a good faith mistake. Yet the practice by
which the court made law is sufficiently distinct from the legislative approach
to lawmaking that it makes sense to call it adjudication. The Court was not
deciding on the best policy to apply in State v. Jones. Instead, it was trying in
good faith to determine how the legislature wanted its rules to be interpreted.
The judges were not trying to impose their values on the case, but were instead
trying to determine what the values of the legislature-the accepted lawmakerhad been.
Now, in practice, when legislative language is open to interpretation in a
case of first impression it is almost impossible for a judge to determine what the
legislature would have intended without being in some degree influenced by his
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or her own values. 7 To vary our burglary example somewhat, consider the case
of Sally Smith who was lost in the woods for ten days surviving on insects and
berries. One night, shortly after sundown, she stumbled into a clearing and saw
a hunting cabin. When no one answered her knock, she broke a window, entered
the cabin, found food, and prepared a decent meal. This case involves two issues
of legal interpretation. The first is whether a hunting cabin that is ordinarily
vacant qualifies as a "dwelling" within the meaning of the statute. The second
is whether the statute contains an implicit exception for starving people who
break into dwellings in search of food.
The legislation is ambiguous on both points. Indeed, had the problem been
posed, different legislators might have had different views. Yet the court is
supposed to determine legislative intent. A judge who believes firmly in the
sanctity of private property is more likely than a judge with socialist leanings
to find that the statute covers any property in which people sometimes dwell and
is likely to hold that although the particular motivations for breaking into another's dwelling might justify a lenient sentence or a gubernatorial pardon, they
do not change the fact that the behavior is proscribed by the law. A judge who
places a high value on human life and a lesser value on private property might
hold that the legislature did not intend its proscription to apply in emergency
situations, or if the judge felt constrained by the legislative language on this
point, he might interpret "dwelling" to mean a "regularly inhabited building. " 8
Here the court is clearly close to lawmaking in a legislative sense. The
judges are applying their own values to determine not what the legislature would
have intended had they contemplated the situation that arose, but rather, what
the legislature should have intended. Nevertheless, we would still call this adjudication provided two conditions are met: ( 1) that the interpretation be interstitial in nature; that is, the court is filling in gaps in what is, generally speaking,
a legislatively ordered scheme of things; (2) that the court interpret in good faith
the cues that exist concerning legislative intent. These include committee reports
and other legislative history as well as the statutory language. Good faith interpretation requires an awareness of one's own values and the ability to perceive
and respect conflicting values that are embodied in legislation.
Finally, we come to the other extreme in which legislative texts give no
guidance or, fairly read, suggest a different interpretation from that which the
court endorses. Here judges are, in effect, stating what they think is the best
policy to govern a situation. This is pure judicial lawmaking. Perhaps the best
example of judicial lawmaking in recent years is the abortion case, Roe v. Wade,
7. On some occasions there are clear guides such as statements in floor debates, committee reports,
or other legislative history that contemplate the situation that has arisen and state how it would be
resolved under the law. Judges will also consult for guidance related laws and precedents in their
own and other jurisdictions.
8. Note that both judges might find they had to refine their interpretations further in future cases.
The first judge might think a different rule justified when the entrance was to save those in a dwelling
from a fire, and the second judge might come to interpret "regularly inhabited" differently when
confronted with cases in which vacation homes had been entered by vandals or thieves.
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410 U.S. 113 (1973) and, in particular, the detailed lines the Court draws.
Nothing in the Constitution (or readily derived therefrom) suggests that states
cannot regulate abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy, can engage in
limited regulation during the second trimester, and can regulate extensively
during the final three months. Yet this is what a majority of the Supreme Court
held.
We do not mean to imply by this analysis that the decision in Roe was
wrong. We express no opinion on that matter. We are saying that the Supreme
Court in this case, as in other cases, crossed the fuzzy line that usefully, if
somewhat unclearly, separates adjudication from legislation. The majority in
Roe, almost completely unconstrained by the language of the Constitution or the
received body of law, enunciated what they thought was the wisest policy given
the conflicting values involved.
In defense of the Court one might argue that it was forced to act as it did.
For the Constitution as it had been interpreted to that point did not clearly imply
that there was not a right to abortion or that states were free to restrict abortions
as they chose (Regan, 1979), and the body of precedent involving privacy rights
on the one hand and the states' police power on the other cut in two directions.
This is often the situation when courts make law in this sense. They are called
on to resolve a conflict, and the received law either fails to give substantial
guidance or, especially in the case of precedent, is too dated to merit respect.
Judges are, in effect, forced to make legislative judgments. But even in these
circumstances there is an important sense-perhaps the most important sensein which the decision making remains adjudicative. When courts make law,
norms of judicial behavior are salient, and courts follow judicial procedures.
Adjudicative processes differ from legislative ones, and the differences can have
important implications for the law that results. 9 Moreover, courts generally see
their task not as deciding on the best possible rule to govern a situation but as
choosing from among a more limited set of rules that it is plausible for a court
to enunciate given the case posed by the parties. Thus in Brown v. Board of
Education the Supreme Court could make law by declaring legally segregated
schools unconstitutional. It could not in Brown have ordered the Congress to
allocate special funds to southern school boards that dismantled dual school
systems. While the Court's decision in Brown was arguably legislative in nature,
9. One difference is that adjudication centers around a particular case while legislation usually
focuses on a particular problem. A second difference is that legislators can reach out to inform
themselves through constituent polls and legislative hearings, and may count on hearing from those
interested in the legislation in any event. Only the parties to a case have a right to inform a court
no matter how widespread the implications of a prospective ruling, but courts knowing they shall
make law often allow a few interested parties to state their concerns in what are called "amicus"
or "friend of the court" briefs. Finally, and perhaps most saliently, legislators are expected to
represent constituents and must regularly stand before them in genuinely contested elections. High
court judges are usually appointed for life or for long terms punctuated by elections that are either
seldom seriously contested because incumbency is such a substantial advantage (Dubois, 1984) or
tum more on a judge's party affiliations than on the decisions he or she has reached.

444

Distribution

it was appropriate for a court although other kinds of legislative commands
would not have been.
Finally, to make law judges must write opinions, for it is the opinion that
identifies the legal rule. While in a particular case a ruling broadly favoring
either party might be appropriate, not all justifications for possible rulings are
permissible. This need to justify decisions constrains the kinds of legal rules
that courts make. Roe, arguably, would have appeared much less exceptional
had a different justification been advanced (Regan, 1979).

Styles of Judging
When we look at judicial decision making, we can distinguish two approaches.
Following Weber (1968) we call these stances formal rationality and substantive
rationality. These terms describe styles of thought-ways that courts position
themselves vis-a-vis the corpus juris they must apply and interpret. Formal
rationality is the mode of thought associated with judicial formalism as we
describe it in Chapter 12. As we have noted, it abstracts persons and actions out
of the real world, fits them into legal categories, proceeds to manipulate those
categories as the law specifies, and decides cases accordingly. 10 A formally
rational court might reason as follows in the case of our suburbanite, John Jones,
who turned down the wrong cul de sac:
The statute proscribes breaking and entering the dwelling of another at night. When
Jones smashed a window pane and then lifted the window and walked through it,
he was certainly breaking and entering. The dwelling was owned by another person
and the act occurred after sundown and before sunrise. Therefore Jones is guilty of
burglary.

The formally rational jurist might find the result that his analysis leads to dissatisfying, but that does not concern him as judge. What concerns him is that
the result follow logically from the facts as he understands them and from the
law as it is written.
Perhaps the best example of a judge who was able and felt compelled to
make such a separation was Felix Frankfurter. In one case (Louisiana ex rel
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) the Court confronted the situation
of a young man who was condemned to die in the electric chair. For some reason
the chair was faulty, and although electric current apparently shot through the
man, he survived. The issue was whether a second electrocution could proceed
or whether it was barred by the constitutional proscription of cruel and unusual
10. For those familiar with Plato's allegory of the cave, we can offer a nice analogy to formal
rationality. Real people and real actions are, in all their complexity, like the live people walking
before the mouth of the cave. The law is the sun that casts images on the wall of the cave. Legal
categories are the two-dimensional shadows that only partly capture the nature of the real people
and objects that they represent. Formally rational jurists are people who have been in the cave for
such a Jong time that they take the shadows for the real thing and proceed to act accordingly.
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punishment, double jeopardy and other violations of due process. Frankfurter,
finding that the chair's deficiency was entirely accidental, concurred in the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court that nothing in the Constitution
prevented the state from proceeding with a second execution, but he also implied
that the situation was one in which a governor might be expected to intercede
with executive clemency. Not content with this, Frankfurter, after the opinion
was filed, wrote a personal letter to the governor urging the extension of mercy.
Thus the man who could have prevented the execution as a judge (the case was
decided by a 5-4 vote) felt that in this capacity the law required him to let the
execution proceed, but as a private person he directed his immense prestige
toward the end of sparing the life of a young black man he did not know. Power,
however, lay in the role and not the person, for the governor allowed the execution.
The substantively rational judge proceeds, by contrast, with an end in view.
The end must to some extent be derived from some normative system that is
external to the legal system, for if the end were fully specified by law, substantive
and formal rationality would collapse into the same set of prescriptions for legal
affairs. To draw on the "Case of the Confusing Cul-de-Sac" for one last time,
a ~ubstantively rational judge might have acquitted Jones by looking not at the
language of the law, 11 but at the ends that the legislature that passed the breaking
and entering statute might have had in mind. He might argue that the legislature
was concerned with breaking and entering because this was a common prelude
to evils such as vandalism or theft and that they wished to be able to punish
those who were interrupted before they had completed the crimes for which they
entered. Finding that John Jones did not enter with the intent to engage in any
criminal act, this substantively rational judge might acquit. Another substantively
rational judge might decide that the legislature's goal was to deter breaking and
entering the dwellings of others for any reason. Finding that John Jones could
not have been deterred even had he known of the statute because he did not
know that the house he was entering was not his own, this substantively rational
judge might also acquit.
In each of the preceding cases the judge in interpreting the statute purports
to be deciding what end the legislature that enacted that law had in view and is
refusing to apply the statute when it does not serve the legislative end. However,
by hypothesis neither the statute nor its legislative history suggest any end except
the punishment of those who break into the homes of others at night. John Jones
clearly did this. In deciding that he should not be punished, our first substantively
rational judge is relying on the Judeo-Christian normative ethic as it relates to
the moral implications of intent, and the second substantively rational judge is
guided by the ethic of utilitarianism. Thus concepts from extralegal ethical
systems get infused into the law since they are a reference point for determining
what the legislature was about. If the goal is to interpret faithfully the legislative
11. Recognized guides to statutory interpretation such as statements in legislative debates explaining
the meaning of legislative language might be consulted by the formally rational jurist as part of an
internally focused analysis of legislative meaning.
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intent, this is not necessarily improper. The legislature probably never contemplated poor John Jones lost in a too familiar cul-de-sac, but if they had, they
might well have rewritten the statute to exempt good faith mistakes. Nor is this
surprising; the values of judges and legislators are often likely to be rooted in
the same extralegal ethical systems.
There are two circumstances in which the substantively rational judge may
look to different sources of norms and values from those that influenced the
legislature. One is when the cultural milieu in which the legislature acted has
been so transformed over time that to be true to what were perhaps the specific
understandings of the legislature is to be untrue to the concerns that motivated
the legislation. In this situation a substantively rational court may try to discern
the concerns of the legislature that enacted the law and interpret the statute so
as to best realize those concerns in the context of contemporary culture. For
example, the Congress that proposed the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution was trying to guarantee political equality for
black people and by so doing wipe out the "badge of slavery." They probably
did not think that the Fourteenth Amendment would someday entail the destruction of segregated school systems. Indeed, schools in Washington, D.C., whose
practices the Congress could have cofltrolled, were segregated at the time the
Civil War amendments were passed. Yet by 1954 the effort to guarantee political
equality and to stamp out the vestiges of slavery required the destruction of
legally segregated school systems. In this context, to be guided by what the
lawmakers thought the Fourteenth Amendment entailed for segregated schooling
would be to undercut the grander purposes they hoped to accomplish. If the
Amendment was to remain an effective vehicle for the abolition of vestiges of
slavery, it would have to be interpreted in the light of contemporary culture and
not by reference to the normative understandings of a century before.
The second circumstance in which a substantively rational court looks to
extralegal norms and values different from those that motivated the legislature
is when the court subscribes to a different ethic and is trying to achieve a different
substantive goal. Thus in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) the Supreme
Court struck down a state law establishing a 10-hour maximum workday and a
6 day workweek for bakers, holding that because baking was not an especially
unhealthful profession, the legislature could not interfere with people's rights to
sell their labor. The state legislature was seeking to enact a set of norms grounded
in their perception of the nature of professional baking and what the welfare of
the workers required. The Court was advancing its conception of freedom of
contract, a conception that was closely linked to entrepreneurial values in a
capitalist society. Judges, however, are not supposed to substitute their normative
views for those of legislatures; therefore, in cases like Lochner the process has
to be disguised.
Perhaps the simplest solution is to ignore issues or dismiss them without
serious consideration when good faith attention to what the law implies might
mandate a result inconsistent with substantive goals. Appellate decisions in
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routine criminal cases suggest that this technique is frequently applied (Davies,
1982). Courts often dismiss in a sentence or two a defendant's possibly substantial
objections to the way his case has been processed when it is clear that the
defendant has committed the crime charged. Alternatively, evidentiary or procedural errors at trial are acknowledged, but they are dismissed as "harmless,"
even though to one reading the opinion-and sometimes to dissenting judgesit appears that the error might well have affected the verdict. The other side of
this, and equally revealing of a substantive orientation, is that when an appellate
court believes that an injustice has been done at trial, it will if necessary seize
on relatively trivial errors that are unlikely to have affected the verdict and
reverse the case on these grounds.
A second technique is to misinterpret the legislature's intent and claim to
be upholding it while in fact embellishing or even subverting it. This was the
technique of the Lochner majority who found in the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment an intent to preclude certain kinds of state interference with the
ability of people to set the terms on which they sold their services. Yet there is
no reason to believe that drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment had any intention
to preclude racially neutral labor regulations like those in Lochner, nor is such
an intention fairly deducible from the language or history of the amendment. 12
A third method is to retreat to pseudo-formalism. A court interpreting ambiguous language may pretend it is constrained by the language used when the
legislative language could be fairly construed to mean something very different
and the legislature obviously meant to attach the different meaning. Or a court
may distort reality in order to reach a desired result. In Lochner, for example,
the legal rule the Court purported to be following was that legislation setting
maximum hours of work was an unconstitutional interference with freedom of
contract unless there was a valid health-related reason that justified the limitation.
Since the majority of the Court found that baking was not an especially unhealthy
occupation, it followed that the rule had to be struck down. However, the dissent
made it clear that there was substantial evidence that baking was a particularly
difficult and unhealthy profession. The majority simply ignored this evidence so
that their conclusion appears required by a logical, formal analysis. It is only
when we read the dissent that it appears that the decision is controlled not by a
true commitment to formalism, but by a desire to achieve substantive ends that
are inconsistent with the concerns that motivated the legislature.
In separating formalistic from substantive stances in judging, we do not
mean to imply that one style necessarily yields better results or, indeed, is more

12. Earlier Supreme Court decisions had extended the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment in this
direction, so the Lochner majority was building on precedent. To the extent that judges in the Lochner
majority were actually responding to the fair implications of precedent that they felt constrained by
rather than to some extralegal perspective of where the good of society lay, the Court was looking
to a recognized source of legal authority in a common law system and there is a formalist element
to Lochner.
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appropriate for a court than the other (cf. Kennedy, 1976; pp. 1710-1711). As
we shall see in the discussion that follows, depending on the context in which
a law is applied, one or the other style may be more likely to enhance justice
or aspects of justice in the sense we have been using that term.
It is also important to note that the separation in styles that we can make at
the level of ideal types is far neater than what one finds when the behavior of
actual judges is examined. Formalist judges must work with language that is not
defined by the legislature but is comprehensible because judges and lawmakers
share a community of meaning. Behind this community of meaning are shared
extralegal norms including rules of grammar and ethical norms that help a judge
understand what a legislature means by the language it uses. Moreover, cases
continually arise which are hard because the implications of legal language are
not clear, and the formalist judge must do more than reason logically from
distinctively legal sources of authority. Even with respect to procedural issues,
that special province of formalism, results that appear substantively absurd properly shape the interpretation of legal language, for it is usually reasonable to
assume that a legislature did not intend absurd results to follow from procedures
it specified. Thus, a judge often cannot understand what a legislature means by
certain language unless he shares an extralegal standard that allows certain interpretations to be ruled out because their implications would be silly or intolerable.
A substantively oriented judge on the other hand is still working within the
confines of law and legal procedures. As we earlier noted, even if a variety of
decisions may be reached on the facts of a case, many decisions that might be
possible for a legislature (or a dictator, for that matter) are unavailable to a
judge. Similarly, not all plausible justifications for a permissible decision may
be advanced by judges. Usually a judge motivated by substantive concerns must
at least be able to dress up an opinion-if the case requires one-in formalistic
language, and if such dressing up is difficult it may be that the decision is
changed. Also substantively oriented judges are likely to proceed formalistically
in much of what they do. The role of judge contains a commitment to formalism
at its core. Where the implications of legal language and procedures are clear,
the substantively oriented judge is likely to accept them even though this results
in an outcome that is by reference to some nonlegal standard undesirable. If a
judge only drew on nonlegal sources as guides to decisions, he would, in a
modern Western society, not be acting like a judge.
Despite the necessary commingling of formalist and substantive tendencies
in actualjudging, it is helpful to separate the two styles as ideal types. As we
shall see next, strong tendencies in these directions when combined with different
types of laws can yield legal systems with distinct implications for relations
between classes and the quality of justice in society. These systems too are ideal
types, but we shall show by way of example that laws in the spirit of such
systems do exist, and that actual legal systems are mixtures of laws that tend in
several of the directions we identify.
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THE QUALITY OF APPLIED LAW
In looking at legislation, we noted that at the extremes it is either status neutral
or distributively oriented in character. Building on Chapter 12 and on the foregoing discussion, we can characterize a court's approach as either formalistic
or substantive when it is called on to apply legislation. A formalist court is one
that approaches law in the way that we describe in Chapter 12 as judicial formalism. Judicial formalism is characterized by a formally rational approach to
the interpretive problems arising when courts apply law. This entails two elements
that we discussed separately in Chapter 12. The first is close attention to legislative meaning. The law is taken by a formalist court as given and is interpreted
in accordance with the logical implications of the statutory language, supplemented where the language is ambiguous, by legislative history, precedent, and
other recognized sources of legal meaning. The second is the attempt to reduce
legislative meaning to a set of distinctly legal categories that are used to classify
behavior and determine its legal implications. In addition, judicial formalism
also includes a commitment to procedural regularity regardless of what is in
dispute.
It is important to note that these factors taken together do not necessarily
guarantee a specific outcome in a particular case. The law is often sufficiently
open textured that formalist reasoning does not yield a unique answer to the
questions a case poses. What is important is the stance the judge takes toward
the law. A formalist judge not only proceeds as described in the preceding
paragraph, but is also not influenced in his reasoning by the outcome the interpretive process yields except to the extent that the law or other sources of
legal authority specify that the particular outcome is to be taken into account.
A substantive approach, on the other hand, looks, as we have seen, to
sources outside the law in determining the legal implications of action. The
extralegal sources of authority may be of a social, ethical, or political sort. A
court may, as some nineteenth-century courts apparently did (Horwitz, 1977),
ask what kinds of rules would best promote industrialization and decide accordingly. It might, in deciding on the constitutionality of Sunday closing law be
influenced by its view that Sunday is the Lord's day. And it might in deciding
the constitutionality of rules that, in effect, imprison citizens who have committed
no crime [Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)] or in trying alleged
subversives (Solzhenitsyn, 1973), be responding to what the political exigencies
of the day seem to require.
The extralegal sources of normative authority that a substantively oriented
court looks to in applying the law may or may not be the same sources that
influenced the legislature in its law-making activity. If the source is not the same,
the court may hamper or even forestall a legislative effort to achieve certain
goals. At certain points in U.S. history, most notably before the Civil War and
in the early New Deal period, crises developed because the Supreme Court in
interpreting the Constitution was influenced by a set of extralegal social and
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ethical values that were antithetical to those that were motivating the legislature.
At other points the receptiveness of courts to values other than those that motivated the legislature has been celebrated for its contribution to freedom. Indeed,
one institution, the jury trial, is largely predicated on the value of building into
the legal system a decision maker that may freely import values from extralegal
spheres.
Although cases in which a substantively oriented court seeks to subvert the
legislative intention are striking, it is no doubt more common for a court to share
the values that motivated the legislature. After all, judges and legislators are
both politically sensitive elite decision makers and typically share a common
culture. Where a substantively oriented court shares legislative values, decisions
are typically outcome-driven. The court strives to achieve the ends that motivated
the legislature even when the legislative language, higher law (e.g., the Constitution), or its own procedural requirements do not countenance the desired
result. This situation is particularly evident in appellate decisions in criminal
cases where courts routinely overlook procedural and constitutional flaws when
they think the defendant is in fact guilty (Davies, 1982; Lempert & Saltzburg,
1982, p. 2).
In the discussion that follows we identify different ideal types of applied
law and examine their implications for social justice. To do this without writing
another book, we must make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we
assume that a substantively oriented court shares the legislature's extralegal
values, and that these shared values include a concern for equality where legislative influence is more or less equal and a concern for the dominant class's
interests where great inequalities of influence exist. The substantively oriented
court differs from a formalistic court in that in seeking to achieve these and
other shared values, it is relatively unconstrained by the features that define
judicial formalism, although in writing opinions it may appear to bow to them.
Because the substantive courts we consider aim at ends the legislature seeks to
achieve, ordinarily these courts will decide cases in the same way as formalistic
courts which are, at the level of the ideal, oriented solely to legal norms. We
shall ignore such cases and focus on situations in which the judicial stance makes
a difference.
We assume also that in a society in which people have more or less equal
influence, the parties also have more or less equal competence in making claims
on the legal system, and that in societies where political influence is very unequal,
legal competence similarly varies. 13 Thus where political and social equality
prevails people will be generally familiar with their legal rights, will know how
to pursue claims on their own, will know when to tum to lawyers, and will be
able to retain legal counsel where necessary. In highly unequal societies access
to law will be closely associated with other indices of social power.
13. This assumption collapses one requisite of legal autonomy with one of the dimensions that
distinguishes the four types of legal endowments that we specified earlier in this chapter. This
congruence is not necessary, but we expect that as an empirical matter a correlation between the
two is likely.
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Finally, we are concerned here only with what the legal system-by which
we mean the law and the way it is applied-implies for individual rights and
for the distribution of power and welfare across classes or other identifiable social
groups. This concern means that we are at least as interested in the run-of-themill adjudication that occurs in ordinary trial courts as we are in the less frequent
but more visible decisions that emerge on appeal. Also we do not concern
ourselves with aspects of the law as applied that have no systematic distributive
consequences.
If we cross-classify the four types of endowments that legislatures can create
(Table 13.2) with the different stances that courts can take when applying them,
we get the following possibilities:
TABLE 13.2
The Quality of Applied Law

Judicial Stance Toward Legislation
Substantive

Type of Legislative Endowment

Formalistic

Class-oriented
endowments

Unrestrained class
domination (1)

Bounded class
domination (2)

Differentially accessible general
endowments

Illusory rights (3)

Formal autonomy (4)

Equally accessible general
endowments

Egalitarian justice (5)

Pure autonomy (6)

Welfare-oriented endowments

Substantive justice (7)

Formal justice (8)

At the outset it is important to note one distinction that pervades this table.
Recall from Chapter 12 that formalism is a core component of legal autonomy
in the law application process. The other two components, equal competence
and neutral norms, are in this table aspects of the four types of legal endowments
we identified earlier. Formalism by itself is sufficient for partial autonomy. A
legal system characterized by judicial formalism is, other things being equal,
more autonomous than one in which substantive adjudication is common. Note
also that legal autonomy may sound like a good thing, but its full implications
should be considered before making value judgments.
Unrestrained Class Domination
Cell 1 of Table 13.2 describes the situation that exists when one class openly
dominates both the legislative and judicial processes. 14 In such a system laws
are passed to promote the interests of the dominant class, and they are interpreted
by courts with the same end in view. If it should happen that a law designed to
14. We speak throughout of a dominant class, but it may be that groups with somewhat different
class interests share dominance.
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advance the interests of the dominant class threatens to run counter to those
interests, the law will be interpreted to avoid these untoward results.
For example, a powerful immigrant group may choose to move less powerful
natives from rich farmlands to barren territory. The move may be formalized in
a treaty by which the chiefs of the native groups agree to trade their fertile land
for the new territory. If the legal system is of our first type, a suit by a native
seeking title to his ancestral homeland on the ground that he did not consent to
the treaty and that the consent of his chief was coerced will be rejected by the
courts even if all other land transfers in the society require the consent of the
landowner and are void when consent is coerced. On the other hand, should
valuable minerals be discovered on the land given to the natives, they will be
again moved, and should they seek to resist the move in court, the treaty guarantees will be found in some way deficient. For example, a court might argue
that the presence of substantial mineral wealth meant that the guarantees were
void because of mutual rriistake. The appropriate remedy will, however, not be
the return of the native' s original property as would have happened had a contract
between two members of the dominant group been voided for mutual mistake.
Instead, the remedy will be to find land as valueless as the original land was
thought to have been, and to move the natives to it. Of course, had it been the
rich farmlands that yielded even more valuable minerals, the native's claim that
the treaty should be voided for mutual mistake would be dismissed out of hand.
This is because a court in this cell does not look first to what the facts and the
law imply for the outcome, but instead decides what outcome is most in the
interest of the dominant class and finds facts or interprets the law so as to yield
that outcome.
A system in which law is both enacted and applied in such a purely instrumental fashion is one of unrestrained class domination. The legal system in such
a society is insofar as it applies to transactions between classes a sham. It is a
convenient form of governance, designed to give the appearance of legality to
a use of state power that is entirely predictable from the relative class positions
of the parties to the dispute. In its pure form, the legal system defined by cell
1 is the legal system of a tyranny which, in fact, rules by force.

Bounded Class Domination

Cell 2, which we call bounded class domination, is more interesting. As in cell
1, legislation is openly designed to advance the interests of the dominant class.
Unlike cell 1, though, the decision to proceed through rules is respected in the
judicial process, and rules, even those enacted to advance one class's interests,
have a certain generality to them. In particular, even as applied they only order
behavior with reference to categories and in ways that the legislature has specified
in advance, and they can only be applied through legal procedures. The fair

Styles of Law and the Attainment of Social Justice

453

application of these rules will not always leave those of higher status in a dominant
position and will limit the ways in which the wishes of the powerful can be
realized. E. P. Thompson (1975) makes the point convincingly in his study of
the Black Act, an English law that made capital a variety of offenses that were
common in forested areas, such as stalking deer in disguise at night, poaching
hares or fish while armed and disguised, and cutting down planted trees. Although
the acts were bloody, enforcement was far more restrained than many landed
gentry would have liked. At a minimum it was necessary to prove guilt in a
court of law. Knowing that someone is guilty does not necessarily mean that
the offense can be proven. Tactics that might have been more effective in
preventing poaching such as the abduction and slaying of suspected poachers
were precluded once the decision was made to proceed through law.
Even slave law that validates the dominance of the master class may as part
of the scheme of domination accord rights to slaves that are respected in court.
Marc Tushnett (1975) in an erudite article on the antebellum South shows how
the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to define slaves simultaneously as chattel,
personal property, and, in some respects, human beings, resulted in a set of
rules that restrained the general power of whites over blacks and, in some
measure, the power of masters over their own property. Eugene Genovese ( 1972,
p. 36) describes the particularly poignant story of a slave named Will, who had
attempted to run away from an overseer who was trying to whip him. The
overseer got a gun and tried to shoot Will. Will killed the overseer instead and
pleaded innocent by reason of self-defense. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
sustained Will's plea, but fearing extralegal retaliation Will's master sold him
and his wife to a slave owner in Mississippi. A few years later the wife arranged
to have herself sold back to her former master, but Will was not with her. He
had killed a fellow slave in Mississippi, and he had been tried for murder,
convicted, and executed. As his wife recalled, "Will sho'ly had hard luck. He
killed a white man in North Carolina and got off, and then was hung for killing
a nigger in Mississippi." Formal justice triumphed in both instances.
Systems of bounded class domination are found in societies in which marked
stratification is so entrenched that substantial inequalities are taken for granted.
There is no need for the dominant class to act as if its supremacy was not
preordained or to eschew using the legal system to institutionalize the dominant
order. At the same time, there are pressures on the dominant class to rule through
law. This may in part be because a measure of legitimacy attaches to the rule
of law even when the legal order perpetuates inequality. It may also, and in
larger measure, be because law has become the accepted way of regulating
relationships within the dominant classes, and it is natural to use the same device
to regulate relations between classes. In regulating behavior within classes, the
legal system is largely autonomous of class interests because social class does
not substantially differentiate the parties. This autonomy and, in particular, the
formalistic approach to law application that is its hallmark, carries over to some
degree when intraclass differences are in issue.
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Illusory Rights
Cell 3 defines a system in which differentially accessible general endowments
are interpreted and applied by a substantively oriented court. We call such a
system a system of illusory rights. Where such a system exists the decision of
the dominant class to proceed by creating differentially accessible endowments
rather than class oriented endowments is a kind of mystification. Rights are
apparently open to all, but, in fact, they are largely accessible only by those in
the dominant class, and so the enforcement of those rights serves to perpetuate
the existing system of domination. Rights to private property in a markedly
unequal society have something of this character as does the right to sue in court
when this is, in practice, conditioned on the ability to pay substantial lawyer
and filing fees.
From the point of view of the dominant element the problem with differentially accessible general endowments is that the in principle openness of rights
means that on occasion those from the dominated groups will be in a position
to assert rights against those who are ordinarily on top. This flaw may be
"corrected" by a substantively oriented judiciary, that is, a judiciary that values
the same ends as the dominant class and will sacrifice formalism to obtain them.
In these circumstances rights prove illusory. When the less-advantaged attempt to assert them they disappear, for they were not meant to be asserted by
the less advantaged in the first instance. For example, a society may purport to
value freedom of speech, and cloaked with this freedom, those who control the
media establishment may disseminate whatever message they choose. But when
less powerful groups through their own media try to organize unions, promote
pacifism, or suggest revolution the right to free speech may be reinterpreted so
that it does not apply where there is a clear and present danger to the national
security and the likelihood of imminent harm may be found even though a fair
reading of the facts does not justify the conclusion. Thus, the desirability of the
outcome from an extralegal political perspective determines how the facts and
law are manipulated to yield a decision.
Pseudo-formalism of this sort is likely because the decision to proceed
through status neutral law in the first instance probably reflects the belief that
there are advantages to be gained from the appearance of neutrality. Pseudoformalism helps preserve this appearance. The illusion of neutral rights can, of
course, be heightened if the rights of the less advantaged are genuinely respected
in situations where this carries no implications for the relative power of contending classes.
To some extent laws creating differentially accessible general endowments
are found in contemporary capitalist and socialist states. However, in the case
of the Western democracies at least, the pure type is too extreme to capture what
is going on. Class structures are not so extreme; and it is not clear that most
rights were established largely to advantage superior classes. Moreover, only
some courts some of the time interpret rights differently depending on the status
of the claimant, so rights in the system are not fully or generally illusory.
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Formal Autonomy
Cell 4 describes a type of law we call formal autonomy. Such systems are like
systems of illusory rights in that legal endowments are created with full knowledge that they are differentially accessible. They differ in that once legal endowments are created, all those in a position to assert a right can enjoy its benefits
regardless of whether they are members of the initially privileged classes. Systems of formal autonomy tend to reproduce the existing class structure, but it is
a permeable structure that is reproduced. By acquiring wealth and power despite
a legal system skewed in favor of those who are already well off, the initially
disadvantaged can move into the advantaged strata. Those of higher status can
similarly slip if they fail to take advantage of the benefits that are specially
accessible to them. Such transpositions of places have few if any implications
for the distribution of power between classes, for the class system is more or
less indifferent to the specific people who occupy the dominant or subordinate
positions in society or the backgrounds from which they come (Balbus, 1977,
Pashukanis, 1980).
Formal autonomy is often associated with law under capitalism. Positions
are open to talent and there is considerable movement of people across positions,
but it unquestionably helps to start life as a well-off member of society. Furthermore, the system of rights is structured so that those who have power can
use the legal system to reinforce and legitimate the power they choose to exercise.
The legal system of the United States in the late nineteenth century most resembled a system of formal autonomy, and residues of that system are still very
much with us.

Egalitarian Justice
Cell 5, which we call egalitarian justice, describes a system in which legal
endowments created by status neutral laws are in theory and to a large extent,
in practice, equally accessible to all. Where egalitarian justice exists there can
be no gross inequalities that deny large numbers of people access to rights that
are in principle theirs or the ability to invoke the law effectively. In an absolutely
egalitarian society, cell 5 would collapse with cell 6 because everyone would
have the same access to rights and a formalist jurisprudence would treat everyone
asserting a particular legal right or duty the same. Absolute equality is, of course,
achieved nowhere, a fact we recognized when we constructed our endowment
types.
In the less than ideal world the difference between the social conditions of
a society that can expect the egalitarian justice of cell 5 and one that is likely
to be characterized by the illusory rights of cell 3 is one of degree. In cell 3
disparities in social status and legal competence are so extreme that some groups
are largely precluded from enjoying rights apparently extended by the legal
system. In cell 5 differences in social status are small and if neutral endowments
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are not in fact equally accessible, they are more or less so. Indeed, in such a
society we may expect welfare-oriented legislation, like laws providing free legal
services to the poor, that provides nothing of value except access to the legal
process.
The most striking difference between law in cell 5 and that in cell 3 is not,
however, in the quality of rights available nor is it even in the ability of people
to take advantage of the law. Rather, it is in the attitude courts take when hearing
cases that involve parties of unequal status. Where rights are illusory it is because
substantively oriented courts deny claims that would be honored if the social
status of the litigants was reversed. Where egalitarian justice prevails, a substantively oriented court, equally aware of differences in social status, but responding to a different set of extralegal normative imperatives acts in almost the
opposite fashion. It seeks to ameliorate some of the advantages that the better
off enjoy because of their social status. This follows from our assumption that
courts (and legislatures) value equality in societies where equality of influence
is more or less achieved. Cases consistent with this assumption are in fact
encountered.
Everyone, for example, has a right to enter into contracts, but more powerful
parties generally enjoy important advantages in contracting with those who are
weaker. These include better access to information, access to many alternative
contracting partners, familiarity with legal negotiations, and the ability to wait
for a better deal because immediate needs are not pressing. These and similar
advantages can, however, be offset if a court is willing to take the contracting
situation into account in deciding if or in what ways contractual agreements are
binding. Where egalitarian justice prevails, courts do this by considering the
bargaining situation that would have existed had the parties negotiated as equals.
Thus contracts may be voided because one party with special access to information did not share it with another, and in the extreme cases bargains that are
on their face too one-sided will be struck down as unconscionable. Recall the
judge in Chapter 8 who refused to compensate the garage mechanic for the
repairs he had made to the car he sold a Mexican-American. From one perspective
the judge ignored the law governing the rights of parties to contracts, but from
another perspective he was enforcing the contract the parties might have reached
had they been in a more or less equal bargaining position.
In the area of contracts, courts have been most active in constructing "as
if" equalities in their interpretation of "contracts of adhesion." Contracts of
adhesion are contracts between parties who are so unequally situated that one
party to a bargain has little choice but to accept a deal on the terms the other
offers. We are all familiar with contracts of adhesion, for we are parties to many
of them every year. Look at the print on the back of the next ticket you buy for
a train, plane, or boat, or check on the back of your motel door for the details
of the management's liability should a thief break into your room and steal your
valuables. Do you really consent to the limitations on liability that these forms
state? Do you have any ability to bargain over the terms? If you were chartering
a plane or filling a hotel for a convention, you might, but not if you are a lone
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customer. Persist in objecting to the imposed terms and you will walk to the
next town and have no place to sleep.
Some courts, responding to the obvious inequalities of bargaining power
that underlie such contracts, have declared particularly onerous clauses void as
against public policy and have held that ambiguous language should be interpreted
against the interest of the party who dictated the terms. Judge Clark, a distinguished federal judge, nicely summed up for one subset of such cases a result
that might be frequent in a regime of egalitarian justice. "An insurance contract,"
Judge Clark said, "is interpreted just like any other contract, except the insurance
company always loses." 15 Similar substantively rational decision making may
occur on the criminal side when the poor are not punished as seriously as the
wealthy would be for similar acts because their initial disadvantage makes their
criminal behavior more understandable. Thus decisions that embody egalitarian
justice occur, although they do not predominate, in the courts of the modem
welfare state.

Pure Autonomy
Cell 6 defines a system whose prerequisites we laid out in Chapter 12. We call
it pure autonomy. In the ideal case where absolute equality prevails in society
the outcomes of a purely autonomous system are pure procedural justice. We
discuss this possibility in the final section of this chapter. In its real-world
approximations pure autonomy occurs in societies that are more or less equal
when courts accept the inequality that exists and enforce rights and obligations
accordingly. The important difference between the pure autonomy of cell 6 and
the egalitarian justice of cell 5 is that in the former unlike the latter courts do
not try to "correct" in deciding cases for the status disparities that persist in a
more or less equal society.
There are two important differences between law in this cell and the formally
autonomous law of cell 4. They both have to do with what it means for legal
endowments to be differentially accessible. First, differential accessibility is a
function of the rights that are extended. Thus the protections accorded private
property are available only to those who own property in the first instance. This
type of difference is tolerable in systems of both pure and formal autonomy.
But in systems where autonomy is only formal, the degree of inequality is by

15. Reported by Professor Charles Alan Wright, a former clerk to Judge Clark, to a first year class
in civil procedure at the Harvard Law School in the academic year 1964--1965. The quotation may
be inexact and the precise date is forgotten. The rule was called by Professor Wright •'Judge Clark's
law." The occasion for the pronouncement was to avoid breaking up a dinner party when two law
review students who were present proposed to retire to prepare for their insurance law exam. One
can only imagine what the professor grading the exam must have thought when two of his students
cited such a rule and attributed it to one of the country's leading judicial authorities on insurance
law.
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definition much greater than in systems of pure autonomy. Thus the enjoyment
of rights and the burdens of duties are substantially more skewed by class in the
formally autonomous system.
Second, differential accessibility is a function of one's ability to make a
claim in court. Thus a property owner whose property is wrongfully repossessed
to satisfy an alleged debt has no effective property right if he cannot hire a
lawyer to object to the repossession and bring suit. State or private programs
may, however, equalize people's access to court by establishing centers for
informal justice or by paying for attorney's fees, court costs, and the like. Such
subsidies do not improve the general position of a less well-off party, for they
do not improve his social position or expand his stock of rights. 16 But the
subsidies make it possible for less well-off parties to claim in practice whatever
legal rights are theirs in theory. Subsidized access to law is, we would argue,
necessary to pure autonomy and antithetical to formal autonomy. In both types
of systems inequalities may affect the arrangements that parties enter into, but
where pure autonomy prevails there is a guarantee that the privately made arrangements will be enforced as such. In other words, social differences in a
purely autonomous system affect the arrangements parties make between them
and may systematically advantage the more powerful, but the advantage will
stem from social power generally and not from superior access to the legal
system.
This is why the funding of legal services to the poor is often such a hot
political issue. Easy access to legal services threatens to transform a system of
formal autonomy into one of pure autonomy or even egalitarian justice. This is
no small redistribution of power. Pure autonomy like formal autonomy and
egalitarian justice is part of the mix of law found in the modem welfare state.
It is perhaps most prevalent in such common law fields as tort, property, contract
law, and criminal law.

Substantive Justice
Cell 7 describes the law that arises when a legislature enacts laws directed toward
particular goals, and the judiciary, responding to the same values that motivated
the legislature, takes a substantively oriented stance toward the statutes. Although
legislation can further almost any end a legislative majority approves of, we will
focus on laws designed to reallocate benefits from the better off to the less well
off and thus increase justice according to Rawls's difference principle. Where
a court interprets such statutes with the legislature's redistributive ends in view,
the scheme is what we call substantive justice.
For example, suppose a legislature enacts a public housing program designed
to provide decent subsidized housing to poor people. Such programs commonly
16. Except, of course, by adding a right to legal services, but the value of this right depends entirely
on the range of other rights that exist.
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provide for a local housing authority that oversees the construction of housing
projects and then rents apartments to low-income tenants. The housing authority
might, as most authorities do, rent its units with a month-to-month lease that,
in accordance with local landlord-tenant law, allows either party to terminate
the lease on 30 days notice for any reason whatsoever. Suppose a tenant whose
lease has been so terminated alleges that she is being discharged for her efforts
to organize tenants into a union that can pressure the authority to act less like a
bureaucratic landlord and more in the tenants' interests. Tenants' unions appear
consistent with the goal of the statute, which is to improve the position of the
poor in respect to housing; so if the woman is being evicted for attempting to
found a tenants' union, the goals of the statute are being subverted. A substantively oriented court will read the Public Housing Act or more general principles
of constitutional law as prohibiting the local authority from evicting the woman
or acting in other ways that are inconsistent with the overriding goal of the statute
even though neither source of law specifically addresses the issue and the Housing
Act contemplates housing authorities that rely on local law to manage evictions
[cf. Thorpe y. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969)).
When legislatures attempt to reallocate wealth to the needy and courts subscribing to the same ethic cooperate by reading reallocative statutes so as to
maximally advance the interest of the intended beneficiaries, we have a system
oriented to substantive justice. Of course, reallocations may flow in the opposite
direction, for welfare-oriented endowments are not necessarily designed to enhance the welfare of the worst off. If they are not, and a judiciary that shares
the legislature's values interprets the legislation in the light of those values,
marked injustice as measured by Rawls's difference principle can result. The
law as applied will tend to worsen rather than correct for existing inequalities.
In the extreme, there is the danger of going full circle and returning to cell
1. This will occur if the group that enjoys legislative ascendency is during its
period of triumph able to redistribute wealth sufficiently so that the condition of
more or less equal influence that supports welfare-oriented endowments no longer
pertains. What is more likely, however, is not the transformation of society that
would occur if the legal system became overtly class-oriented, but the consistent
exclusion of certain interests from legislative majorities, with the result that these
minority interests are sacrificed to the majority's self-interested vision of the
common good. For example, legislation might criminalize membership in the
Communist party or make membership in the Communist party a basis for
denying passports. When a court that shares the majority's values takes a substantive stance toward such legislation, we have what we may call unrestrained
majority domination, or the tyranny of the majority. The dominated and dominating groups may or may not be identifiable social classes. If they are, domination is likely to be across many areas of social life. If they are not, domination
may be along one dimension. In either case the possibility of majoritarian tyranny
should alert us to the fact that even in a more or less equal society in which
distributive justice is valued, the ideological argument for a substantively oriented
judiciary is fraught with danger. If the political climate changes, the jurispru-
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dential habits that are engendered by such a regime give courts a license to
promote injustice.

Formal Justice
Just as cell 2 dampens the substantive tendencies that make law in cell I a force
for tyranny, so can the formalism of cell 8 limit the justice enhancing effects of
legislation that in cell 7 is a potent force for change. For example, in the case
of the tenants' union leader we have just described, a formalistic court would
not look to the political and ethical values that it shares with the legislature that
enacted the public housing laws. Instead, the judge would look at the means or
form by which the legislature sought to accomplish its end. The primary means
was by creating local housing authorities to stand in the place of private landlords
in renting apartments to poor people. Since the authorities take the form (legal
category) of private landlords, a formalistic court might hold that they have the
private landlord's right to evict anyone, tenants' union leader or inveterate troublemaker, so long as the statutory notice is given. 17 Such a court would not
attempt to look behind the law of tenancies at will to see whether, when applied
to public housing tenants, it furthered the values that underlie public housing or
the purposes of the public housing statute. 18
17. Complexities arise if the legislative history or some other recognized guide to statutory interpretation spells out the social, political, or ethical values the law is designed to promote. If a court
relies on such an aid-like a preamble that says the purpose of a statute is to provide better housing
for poor people-to reach a conclusion regarding permissible grounds for eviction is it reasoning
formalistically or substantively? The answer turns on the extent to which it is permissible to rely
on such guides given the clarity of the legislative language and on whether the court is motivated
by its interpretation of the language of the preamble and about its views of the weight such language
should bear or whether it is motivated by some extralegal sense of where justice or wise policy lies.
In other words, the court is reasoning substantively if it would reach the opposite decision if its
values were different. We can, however, seldom know whether this is the case, so we are often
unable to determine empirically, at least in individual cases, whether a decision is controlled by
substantive or formal considerations. Often, however, when we look at a series of cases, consistencies
or the lack thereof in the ethical content of decisions and the use made of statutory language or
guides to interpretation allow us to identify some judges as being oriented more to formal justice
and others as moved more often by substantive concerns. In addition, the formalistic judge will in
the ideal case seek to reduce the implications of legislation to manipulable rights, duties, and other
legal categories in the way we describe in Chapter 12.
The fact that we may not always be able to neatly label decisions as formal or substantive does
not threaten the basic analysis advanced. The formalistic judge is still subjectively more constrained
by legal language and categories with the restraints this implies than is the substantive judge. The
fact that there is genuine debate about the weight that is appropriately given to various guides to
statutory construction when statutory language is of varying clarity is one reason why a commitment
to legal formality will not necessarily yield a unique decision. What will result, however; is a decision
that reflects judgments about the weight to be accorded statutory language and various guides to
interpretation rather than judgments about the most desirable outcome given some extralegal normative perspective.
18. It would, however, also consider constitutional requirements. A formalistic interpretation of the
law and precedent might lead a court to conclude that the authority's actions were unconstitutional.
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This does not mean that law in cell 8 cannot enhance justice in the sense
we are using this term. It can to the extent that the legislature clearly mandates
justice-enhancing redistributions. In the example we have been pursuing, hundreds
of thousands of poor tenants who refrained from rocking the boat and did not
ask of the authority more than it was willing to give would benefit from subsidized
housing. However, the justice-enhancing aspect of the legislation would be
limited by the forms the legislature chose to follow and the specific endowments
that were given. For this reason we think of the law that results from the
intersection of a formalistic stance toward law and welfare-oriented endowments
as "formal justice."

MIXED JUSTICE
We have often noted that the types we create in this book through cross-classification
are ideal and may not be found in any actual system. In the instant case we
think the different types of law may be identified-sometimes in their pure
forms-in actual legal systems. However, no legal system is purely of one type.
Instead, different stances toward law may be found within the bounds of a single
legal system. Thus in Nazi Germany the law relating to the affairs of Jews may
in its application have fit nicely into cell 1, but the law relating to contracts
between Germans may have fit into cell 4 and in some instances into cell 5 or
6. In the United States one may argue that laws representing all the types we
have defined exist now or at one time could have been found.
The Anglo-American legal system is, however, special in one respect. The
institution of the jury guarantees that in wide areas of law tendencies toward
judicial formalism will to some extent be counterbalanced by substantive tendencies. These tendencies need not, of course, reflect the substantive values that
motivated the legislature. Consider, for example, the role that juries played in
worker injury cases or the role that they continue to play in auto accident cases
as discussed in Chapter 5. In these examples jury justice apparently advances
the interests of the less advantaged parties. This is not necessarily the case.
Recall that extralegal substantive concerns motivated southern juries in the 1950s
and 1960s to acquit whites in the face of overwhelming evidence that they had
beaten or killed black people.
The situation can be similar when judges interpret law. To simplify our
discussion, we have thus far assumed that substantively oriented judges share
the values that underlie legislative policies. This need not be the case, and
institutional arrangements like lifetime judicial tenure work to ensure that a
segment of the judiciary will not at any given point in time share the legislature's
values. Where values are not shared, a substantively oriented court may pronounce rules that are inconsistent with or even opposed to those of the legislative
majority.
Yet there are limits on what a judiciary that does not share the legislature's
values can do to thwart the will of the majority, limits so substantial that one
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of the leading students of the Supreme Court, Alexander Bickel (1962), was led
to call the judiciary the ''Least Dangerous Branch.'' Perhaps the most substantial
limit is that courts ultimately do not command armies; they depend on the
cooperation of the other branches for enforcing their orders. But this naked limit
on the judiciary's power is seldom apparent, for courts almost never escalate
conflicts with the other branches to the point that raw power is an issue. The
judicial role ultimately demands deference to insistent political forces. This is
because judges always purport to be applying laws that may be changed by
nonjudicial processes. If the laws are sufficiently clear, a judge will almost
always comply. Thus a substantively oriented court with values different from
the legislature's may gut a statute by interpreting it to mean almost the opposite
of what the legislature intended. Yet if the legislature reenacts the law to make
its purposes inescapably clear, the court will usually enforce the revised law as.
written. Judges acknowledge the legislature's right to have the last word, and
our respect for courts depends to some extent on this acknowledgment.
Within these limits, however, courts have substantial leeway to promote
their own substantive agendas. A legislature may be deeply divided on an issue,
and it may be impossible to get a majority to pass any new law. In these
circumstances the judicial interpretation of a statute will stand whether or not it
accords with the values of the majority that originally drafted and passed the
law. Furthermore, judicial decisions, particularly when they appear to be a fair
reading of the law and evidence, are accepted by many as legitimate and help
shape the popular conception of where justice lies. Thus courts motivated by
different values from those of the legislative majority may limit a statutory scheme
by a formalist interpretation. Judicial formalism does not obviously advance the
court's own values and, perhaps for this reason, seems to mute opposition that
might exist if the court acted with specific reference to an antimajoritarian substantive agenda. Moreover, some judicial action may not be overturned by simple
legislative majorities. This is most often the case when courts are interpreting
constitutions that can be amended only by some supramajoritarian process. When
the difficulties of overturning a court decision are coupled with an authoritative
text so open textured that its various provisions can mean almost anything, a
substantively oriented judiciary has the opportunity to pronounce binding rules
that advance values quite different from those to which the majority of the
moment subscribes. Such rules may be justice enhancing in the Rawlsian sense,
or they may be just the opposite .
. The issues that arise when courts, either through judicial lawmaking or under
the guise of fact finding, respond to substantive concerns that differ from those
of the legislature are fascinating, but we do not have the space to pursue them
further here. The purpose of our brief introduction of these issues, together with
our more extended general discussion of the qualities of different types of law,
is to stress how important it is, in viewing any legal system, to study systematically the ways in which institutional arrangements affect how courts apply
law and the social implications of law as applied.
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THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE: RISKS AND GAINS
The American legal order, as we have just pointed out, is not a pure type. Yet
some species of law are more predominant than others. In particular, over the
past half century, especially with regard to the distribution of social and economic
goods, the dominant tendency has been toward redistributive welfare-oriented
laws. The new laws do not, however, all tend in the same direction. Some seem
likely to increase existing inequalities, many seem designed to reduce inequality,
and some seem aimed at improving the general interest with little attention to
how welfare is distributed among groups or classes. Thus we have the Reagan
"tax reform" of 1981 which left the wealthy better off relative to the poor than
they had been previously. We have numerous transfer programs that like the
food stamp program or public housing enhance the relative status of the poor.
And we have programs like those regulating toxic dumps that appear to be in
almost everyone's interest.
The allocative aspect of legal rules has gained new prominence not only in
areas like civil rights law, but in more mundane areas such as automobile accidents and worker's compensation. It is a movement that from a Rawlsian
perspective has mixed implications for social justice. It involves not only potential
gains, but potential losses as well. In the final section of this chapter, we discuss
some of the prospects and risks facing those who would use law as an instrument
of social justice.

LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS: LAW AND THE ENDS OF JUSTICE
We saw in Chapter 9 that in John Rawls's theory social justice is treated as a
product of the arrangement of rules and institutions. What we have just been
discussing is a set of such arrangements at th~ societal level. We call it the
"legal system" and our ideal types have been designed to illustrate the themes
that may predominate in particular societies at particular points in time.

Liberty Interests

To focus on the situation we know best, the American legal order as it is presently
constituted comes fairly close to achieving the first principle of justice as defined
br John Rawls. It secures a good deal of the basic individual liberties for citizens,
both liberty of conscience and political liberty; and its legal institutions guard
against the possible encroachments of a police state. The movement to enfranchise blacks which we examined in Chapter 11 removed what had been until
recently the most glaring imperfection. But despite these virtues, the system is
by no means perfect. One great danger to the equal distribution of basic liberties
is, as Chapter 10 points out, the potential for economic inequality to encroach
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on rights. A related danger is that the level of welfare in some segments of
society is below the minimum needed for self-respect and meaningful political
rights. Finally, there are still identifiable social groups, such as immigrant aliens,
whose members lack full political rights.

The Trend Toward Equality

When we tum from liberty interests to equality interests and Rawls's second
principle of justice, imperfections mount. The lack of a fair opportunity structure
and large inequalities of welfare that are not justified by the difference principle
are serious problems with which the legal order is just beginning to deal.
When a society is unequal to begin with, the move toward equality through
law is problematic because, as we saw in Table 13.1, relative equality (as opposed
to gross inequality) is necessary for both equally accessible general endowments
and welfare-oriented endowments. The former tend to preserve a more or less
equal status quo in which people rise and fall according to their ability rather
than because of some ascribed status. The latter can take status into account,
with the goal of eliminating status differences.
It might seem that the only way to achieve equality is through revolution
rather than by law, yet the rise of modem welfare democracies tends to belie
this. We shall not at this point attempt even a brief history of how this could
happen, but a few speculations are in order.
To begin, the absolute wealth and power of those in the lower social ranks
has increased substantially over the years and their aggregate power relative to
the higher classes has almost certainly increased as well. Consider, for example,
the implications of some well-known developments. The advance of capitalism
created competition for labor, thereby increasing its value. Changes in the way
warfare was conducted made the ability to conscript masses of men and hold
their allegiance essential to military success. The development of specialized
labor forces and a monetary economy opened up numerous opportunities for
small businesses which could become independent bases of power. The possibility of migration to or within underdeveloped countries further increased the
value of labor and allowed those who migrated to set themselves up as landowning farmers or in businesses that served the growing farming class. Education, spurred by the value of an educated work force and literate consumers,
added to the knowledge of the lower classes and made possible the widespread
dissemination of ideas that threatened to mobilize them for concerted action. In
short, the technological and social developments associated with the rise of
capitalism not only destroyed the old system of feudal privileges, but it also
dispersed power in society, creating a powerful bourgeoisie and a potentially
powerful working class.
The increase in the aggregate power of the lower ranks and the demise of
traditional dependency relationships made government more problematic. One
option that took hold because it seemed to work was the attempt to establish
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legitimacy. In the political arena this involved first giving leading citizens and
then giving almost all citizens a role in government as electors. In the legal
arena this involved regulation through apparently status neutral laws and judicial
formalism, the result being a regime of formal autonomy. This as we have seen
tends from a systemic point of view to preserve existing disparities, but it also
allows both upward and downward mobility, and it permits those of lesser rank
to stake out positions vis-a-vis the higher classes that are legally protected.
From this point the trend toward greater equality has been an iterative
process. With increased power comes the ability to use force and the threat of
force. In the United States labor no doubt benefited both from the costs they
could inflict on industry and third parties through strikes and from the specter
of European revolutions. The spread of the franchise without regard to wealth
and the consequent competition for the voting allegiance of the less well off has
also contributed. Promises have been made and kept to those on the lowest rungs
of society. This in tum increases their power and gives force to demands for
further improvements. The rise of modem Communist and Socialist states has
kept the issue of class inequality at the forefront of the political process. Ideology
has also been important. Although the mechanisms by which ideologies rise and
flourish are poorly understood, the idea of equality has undoubtedly been a
driving force in modem social life. 19
This capsule description of some trends over several centuries may read as
if we mean to suggest that we are in the midst of a inexorable movement toward
increased equality in social life. This is not our conclusion. We should not be
deceived by our ability to make sense of history. It is only in retrospect that
trends appear inevitable. There is no guarantee that the patterns we describe will
continue into the future. 20

19. Note that even if we have accurately described a general trend, it may still be the case that some
groups have been left out, and that the general increase in social wealth has made them relativel_v
less powerful and relatively poorer with respect to average levels of power and well-being in society
than their counterparts were several centuries ago.
20. In particular, it is possible that material circumstances are less conducive to equality (including
equal liberty) than they were a century ago. Modem weaponry makes the allegiance of the masses
less important militarily than it was when fire power had a closer relation to the number of troops
that could be mustered. They also make a military coup more of a threat and a popular revolt less
of a threat to those who control power in modem states. Techniques of social organization and
communication that give those who govern direct access to masses of people, as well as the government's ability to target threats to people, may make the need to maintain the general legitimacy
of government less important than it once was. These techniques also allow governmental power to
be further removed physically (the movement of power from local to state to federal government)
and psychologically (the development of bureaucracy) from the people and in these senses may also
tend to limit the power of the masses. If these speculations are sound, the structure of institutions,
like democratic procedures for choosing those in power, and ideologies, like the ideal of equality,
are increasingly important for maintaining the freedom we enjoy and for the future enhancement of
social equality. To the extent that ideologies change or the workings of democratic processes allow
tyrannical majorities to control the government, liberty and the advance of equality are accordingly
threatened.
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Law as an Instrument for Equality
Consider the situation of the United States. Considerable inequality exists and
with it disparities of political and social power. Those on top have both the
potential for disparate influence and incentives to resist changes that make them
absolutely, and maybe even relatively, worse off. Indeed, they not only stand
to gain from changes that do not give anything to the disadvantaged, but they
may gain by exploiting the few goods the disadvantaged possess.2 1 How in such
a society may law be used to open up opportunities for the worst off and otherwise
increase their enjoyment of valued goods, actions that following Rawls, will be
justice-enhancing so long as basic liberties are not sacrificed in the process.
Three conditions must be met if law is to be an effective force for increased
equality in social life. First, the legal system must in large measure be insulated
from the special pleadings of those who are better off. Second, legal norms must
aim at reducing status differences and at transferring wealth and power from the
better to the worse off. 22 Third, such norms must be able to penetrate the existing
socioeconomic structure and bring about the changes they aim at.

21. Other things being equal, in a society where one person has 10 units of absolute pleasure and
another 5, one would expect the person on top to approve of a change that gives each person 11
units of pleasure. Consistent with this, it appears that movements toward increased equality fare
best when the "pie" is increasing for all. However, at some point satisfactions may attach to
differences in relative positions and the difficulty of judging absolute well-being may lead those on
top to believe that increased equality is absolutely harmful. For example, in one affirmative action
suit a white worker sought to overturn a plan that admitted black workers with less seniority to an
in-plant craft training program ahead of him [United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)].
He probably felt that this effort to enhance interracial equality hurt him. Yet the in-plant program
had been established because the local craft unions from which the company had previously recruited
its craft workers had historically barred blacks thus precluding them from high-paying skilled positions. The white plaintiff was seeking to enhance his salary and position by getting into a program
that would not have existed but for a history of discrimination against blacks. Clearly, he had not
been made worse off by this development. Indeed, while blacks with low seniority were admitted
to the in-plant program ahead of whites with greater seniority, whites were admitted separately
according to their seniority. In the long run, the plaintiff would be made better off by the movement
for enhanced equality because he would eventually have an opportunity that otherwise would not
have existed. Nevertheless, the case he brought suggests he felt victimized by what had occurred.
22. An exception exists according to Rawls when these differences improve the lot of the better off.
Thus when we discuss the movement toward equality as justice-enhancing, we intend to implicitly
include the limitation on movement toward equality implied by the difference principle. It is our
view that although some inequalities of wealth and status enhance the lot of the worst off, given
our current starting point considerable movement toward equality may be accomplished without
any necessary detriment to those on the bottom. The set of equality enhancing changes that the
law must specially aim at and the ones we are most concerned with are those that narrow the
gap between the rich and poor by simultaneously diminishing the advantages of the rich and increasing the well-being of the poor (cf. Rawls, 1971, p. 79). Particularly important are changes that
diminish the access of the advantaged to positions of wealth and power by creating conditions of
fair equality of opportunity that allow the disadvantaged to compete successfully for higher status
positions.
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Formal Autonomy. The first of these, the insulation of the legal system from
the special pleadings of the better off is largely accomplished by a legal regime
of formal autonomy. Formal autonomy, as we have seen, is characterized by
differentially accessible general endowments coupled with a formalistic application process.
The move to formal autonomy from the more status-oriented legal systems
of earlier years appears in retrospect to be a natural development for emerging
capitalist societies. The switch from class-oriented endowments to general ones
eliminated ancient privileges that stood in the way of economic development.
The development of a formalist jurisprudence made the legal consequences of
investments and trades predictable. The status neutral character of both general
endowments and formalist jurisprudence lent legitimacy to the class system, for
it made legal outcomes tum on the actions of organizations and individuals rather
than on their social status.
In addition to these virtues, there are important ways in which formal autonomy promotes liberty. The hallmark of formally autonomous law is a system
of basic rights, which are in principle enjoyed by all. So long as these rights
are exercised in ways that respect the rights of others, the law does not constrain
action. Nor is liberty constrained by uncertainty about what the law implies.
The allocation of wealth and status is mediated not by governmental intervention
but by market-like mechanisms that depend on individual choices rather than on
collective decisions. This means that the legal system does not seek to reallocate
welfare over individual objections. Quite to the contrary, some rights it creates,
like the right to own private property, stake out areas of individual sovereignty,
and other rights, like right to enter into contracts, open up areas for action by
allowing people to plan more confidently for the future. To the extent that these
rights involve basic liberties, formal autonomy preserves the core component of
justice. Formally autonomous law cannot, however, reshape the status quo in
the direction of increased equality. It makes only the "negative" contribution
of limiting the extent to which law can be used to forestall tendencies toward
equality rooted in other spheres. 23
Formally autonomous law extends rights equally to all individuals, but, as
we pointed out when we first discussed formal autonomy, rights are useful only
to the extent that one can take advantage of them. The right to own property is,
for example, not worth much to a person who lacks the ability to acquire any.
Indeed, it limits certain kinds of redistributions that might make people more
equal since a corollary of the right is that the unconsented taking of property is
theft. The example may be generalized. One aspect of being better off is being

23. Formally autonomous law is, in other words, more conducive to equality than a system of classoriented endowments or one of illusory rights. Unlike class-oriented endowments, the differentially
accessible general endowments associated with formal autonomy do not muster the state's power
with the specific goal of maintaining or extending the advantages of the better off. And unlike
systems of illusory rights, formally autonomous systems respect the legal entitlements the worse off
are able to obtain even if this threatens the interests of persons of higher status.

468

Distribution

better able to take advantage of the rights that formal autonomy extends to all. 24
Thus in an unequal society formal autonomy tends to reproduce the status quo
or even to increase existing inequality.
The Transfer of Welfare. If law is to be an independent force for equality, it
must recognize social differences and seek to eliminate them. This is the second
of the three requisites we identified: Legal norms must aim at reducing status
differences and at transferring wealth and power from the better to the worse
off. 25 They must be redistributive welfare-oriented endowments. How is this
state of affairs to come about? If we have an unequal society, why should the
better off, who presumably have disproportionate influence in the law-making
process, consent to laws that transfer welfare to those beneath them? These
questions are, of course, not rhetorical, for thousands of laws that effect such
transfers exist. Nor are the answers simple. Here we can only sketch some
possibilities.
First, because it is most obvious, there are ideological elements. The JudeoChristian ethic has an important egalitarian aspect, in that human differences
pale before God, as well as an important charitable component. Helping the less
well off is a Judeo-Christian virtue. In the United States this ideology energized
redistributive efforts ranging from the localized poor relief programs that have
existed in this country from colonial days onward to the movement to free the
slaves which became a central cause of reform Protestantism during the first half
of the nineteenth century. Complementing this ethic and, no doubt, related to it
is a political culture, in which, as evidenced by the Declaration of Independence
and portions of the Constitution, egalitarian themes have long been deeply
embedded.
Also important is the ideology of formal law. Formal law is legitimating
because it suggests that legal rights are equally available and that when people
come to law, status differences do not matter. The more obviously false these
propositions are, the less likely the law is to be accepted for its own sake, and
the more likely it is that believers in the ideology will support corrective action.
The deficiencies in the formally autonomous model are especially glaring
when the impoverished are unable to call on courts to enforce their rights or are
unable to exercise their rights when called into court by others. The appeal of
the formal autonomy is best revealed in the reception accorded steps taken to
rectify these situations. On the criminal side, the Supreme Court decisions requiring the state to appoint counsel in felony [Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.

24. The better off are also ordinarily more able to avoid the duties that a regime of formal autonomy
imposes on all.
25. At the point where transfers from the well off diminish the amount of goods available to the
worst off, transfers, according to Rawls, should stop. This might happen, for example, if taxes were
so high that skilled people had no incentive to do more than a minimal amount of work and everyone's
standard of living dropped accordingly.
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335 (1963)) and many misdemeanor [Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)]
cases have caused virtually no controversy. Yet in comparison to the highly
controversial exclusionary rule, the right to appointed counsel has, no doubt,
cost the state considerably more money, and it has probably allowed more
factually guilty people to escape conviction for the behavior with which they
were charged. On the civil side, the federal government is currently spending
more than a quarter of a billion dollars a year on legal aid to the poor. Most
revealing was the outcome of the battle early in the Reagan Administration,
which may be repeated in Reagan's second term, to eliminate the federal legal
service program entirely. The administration appeared motivated by both a principled commitment to minimize redistributions 26 and the sense that empowering
the poor to assert their legal rights hurt the interests of valued constituents and
interfered with their agenda for government. That the administration's plan was
thwarted largely due to the defection of conservative congressmen who would
ordinarily support the administration testifies to the ability of an ideology to
motivate action and to the general fit between the ideology of formal autonomy
and conservative views of government. 27
A second reason why redistributive legislation gets passed which is less
obvious than ideology but probably more important has to do with the nature of
inequality in the United States and the character of political life. Inequality is
not constant across all areas of social life, nor are the interests of the more
advantaged uniformly antagonistic to those of the less well off. Equality is itself
a relative matter.
For example, each black person's vote counts the same as each white person's vote. It is true that money counts in politics as it does elsewhere, but if
the average black does not have much influence beyond his vote, neither does
the average white. Thus blacks are probably more equal to whites in the political
arena than they are in economic matters. Moreover, in systems of territorial
representation the ability to aggregate votes within defined boundaries is crucial
to a political voice. Blacks together with other relatively impoverished minority
groups now dominate the political machines in many of the country's largest
urban areas. With local domination there comes not only representation at higher

26. The widespread state funding of counsel in both criminal and civil cases is a relatively recent
phenomena, yet the ideology of formal rationality and the realization that not everyone in fact had
access to the courts or could perform effectively once in court has been around for a long time. This
suggests that even if we are right about the importance of the ideology of formal autonomy in this
area, the disparity between ideology and actuality was not sufficient to motivate change. What was
missing until recent decades was the idea that the government had an affirmative responsibility for
the well-being of individual citizens (cf. Sandalow, 1981).
27. The lobbying efforts of the organized bar were also important and perhaps essential in the struggle
to save legal services. However, while the self-interest of the bar is obvious, the elites who supported
the lobbying had little at stake personally. They were probably motivated by their professional
commitment to formal autonomy. In arguing to the Congress, the theme of equal access to justice
was one to which they constantly returned.
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levels of government but also the obvious potential to swing state or even national
elections. The end result is that relatively greater equality in the political sphere
can lead to transfers that increase equality in economic and social life.
Also the monolithic nature of those on top can easily be overemphasized
while the implications of conditions that cut across class lines are ignored. In
the United States, for example, both major political parties are multiclass coalitions. Although the Democrats do much better with those at the very bottom
of the socioeconomic scale and the Republicans are the predominant choice of
those at the top, the Republican coalition now extends well into the ranks of the
working class, and Jay Rockefeller, to argue by way of example, is a Democrat.
In order to maintain coalitions like these, the parties must offer rewards to those
on the bottom. The rewards may be largely symbolic, such as the support for
school prayer which in recent presidential elections has helped tie fundamentalist
Christians to the Republican coalition, but symbols will often not do. Instead,
concrete rewards that can only be realized by transfers from the better to the
worse off are necessary.
In this connection it is important to note that government transfers are not
confined to the downward direction. Not all welfare-oriented endowments are
aimed at enhancing the welfare of the worst off, nor do they all draw from the
well-to-do. Minimum wage laws, as we pointed out in Chapter 10, transfer
wealth from the least skilled workers whose labor is not worth the minimum
wage to those slightly more skilled who receive more than a market wage because
of the laws. The tax deduction for home mortgages, coupled with the failure to
tax imputed rent, tends to transfer wealth from renters to homeowners, although
the class of homeowners are clearly better off than the class of renters. What
we call welfare payments, like AFDC, transfer money collected largely from
the middle class to those closer to the bottom. Thus one reason laws that aim
at increasing equality exist is that welfare-oriented endowments aim at all sorts
of transfers. Given that the poor play a role in the political process, it is not
surprising that they gain some benefits. Whether as a purely economic matter
the most advantaged have a larger share of the country's wealth than they would
have in a system without massive government transfers (assuming such a system
were possible) is an empirical question that has not yet been satisfactorily answered. 28
Equality is, of course, more than economic. Perhaps the most important
legal contributions to equality have aimed at equalizing political and social rather
than economic well-being. The laws we focused on in Chapter 11 when we
discussed the role of law in promoting racial equality are an obvious example.
Other recent examples include laws designed to prevent discrimination against
women, laws mandating that new construction accommodate the handicapped,
28. Indeed, it may be impossible to answer since there is no obviously correct way to allocate the
benefits of certain governmental expenditures, like those for national defense, across classes. Does
everyone benefit the same? Do the poor benefit the most because they are most likely to be cannon
fodder? Or do the wealthy benefit disproportionately because they have the most to lose from a
destructive war or invasion?
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laws relating to the ''mainstreaming'' of handicapped children, and laws limiting
compulsory retirement. The groups benefited by these laws illustrate our point
that being disadvantaged in one area (e.g., age) does not mean that one is
disadvantaged along some other dimension (e.g., wealth). The justice-enhancing
character of such laws is obvious for they aim to increase liberty and self-respect.
Another part of the explanation for laws that redistribute wealth downward
is that the classes that dominate society are often beset by cleavages, and some
elements of the dominant classes may be natural allies or even champions of
those who are worst off. For example, in the effort to increase racial equality
regional cleavages between elites played an important role. Indeed, the Civil
War is often attributed more to the socioeconomic conflicts that divided the North
and South than to a northern passion to abolish slavery. The two flurries of civil
rights legislations, one following the Civil War and the other in the 1960s
involved statutes supported by northern elites who did not foresee that any of
the interests they represented might be threatened by such laws. When northern
interests were threatened, however, as in school busing cases, the quality of
some laws changed dramatically. For example, instead of laws mandating greater
efforts toward equality, legislation sought to limit court-ordered busing. The
point is, of course, general. Some laws that redistribute welfare to the worse off
can be explained by the fact that they do not run counter to or are in the interest
of the more elite segments of society. We offer as a general hypothesis the
proposition that people are not reluctant to distribute welfare downward when
it is someone else's welfare they are distributing.
Consideration of elite interests brings us to our last point. Generally speaking, wealth and status in society is distributed much like a pyramid with the
base being considerably broader than the apex. Although those on the bottom
individually lack power, their numbers may mean that in the aggregate they can
mount a genuine threat to those above them. Welfare endowments that enhance
equality may reflect neither ideological considerations nor cleavages in the upper
ranks. Instead, they may reflect calculations rooted in self-interest. Thus the
labor laws we discuss in the appendix to Chapter 6 might never have been passed
had not bloody and sometimes successful strikes suggested that industrial peace
was in the national interest. And, somewhat more speculatively, the money and
attention given to urban ghettos following the riots of the mid- l 960s probably
stemmed in part from a desire "to keep the lid on. " 29
29. To the extent that sheer numbers count in the exercise of both raw power and electoral politics,
it may be that the forces leading to laws that enhance equality are self-limiting. As more people
move out of the lower ranks into a broad middle class, the power of those on the bottom and the
momentum for further egalitarian redistributions are likely to diminish. In this connection it is
interesting to speculate on the effects of the inflation of the 1970s. Without increasing people's real
wealth, it raised the dollar incomes of many people substantially and often placed them in higher
tax brackets. By increasing the dollar disparity among those in the lower third of the country's
income distribution and increasing the burden that transfers to the very poor placed on those at the
upper end of this "low budget" range, it may have broken up a broad coalition of interests and
substantially reduced the political power of those at the very bottom.
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This brief survey of reasons why law-making processes dominated by elites
may yield a substantial body of redistributive legislation does not pretend to
depth or completeness. It does, however, begin to explain why, in capitalist
democracies, Jaws that aim toward increased equality are neither rare nor surprising events.
Problems of Implementation. This brings us to our third requisite for using
law to enhance justice. The enactment of a Jaw is not the same as its implementation. If norms that seek to redistribute welfare are actually to contribute
to increased equality, they must be able to penetrate the existing socioeconomic
structures and bring about their intended reforms. In the case of some laws this
is not problematic. With direct transfers of the money, like the AFDC or food
stamp programs, for example, an efficient mechanism, the tax system, is already
in place for taking welfare from those who have it, and self-interest leads most
people who qualify for aid to seek it.
When increased social, political, or certain types of economic equality are
the goals, the problems of penetrating the socioeconomic structure are much
greater. The Voting Rights Act, for example, was only the first step toward
giving southern blacks real political power. The consistent, sympathetic attention
of federal administrators and courts was needed to make legal provisions for
federal registrars, federal poll watchers, and the preclusion of structural changes
(from single member to multimember districts, for example) that might dilute
black votes effective. The Jaw, in other words, is not self-executing, but in the
case of the Voting Rights Act it apparently worked as intended.
Efforts to integrate schools by legal fiat have had a different history, and
success in many areas has been limited. In many northern cities integration meant
the destruction of a few mostly white schools, large-scale busing, and a resulting
system in which every school was predominantly black. When white parents
responded by moving to the suburbs or sending their children to private schools,
the legal system was unable to cope.
This is not to say that coping was in theory impossible. It is conceivable
that a substantively oriented court might have enjoined the opening or expansion
of private schools where this would tend to hinder integration, and cross-district
busing that consolidated largely black inner-city school districts with white suburban ones at one time seemed to be the wave of the future. But ultimately
formalism prevailed. The private school option was never constrained except in
the limited sense that some private schools that discriminated against blacks were
denied the right to a tax exemption. Cross-district busing was severely restricted
by a formalistic view of district boundary lines and because an association was
required between the locus of the wrong and the remedy. Anything other than
formalism might, however, have provoked a clash between the courts, on the
one hand, and the president and Congress, on the other, that the courts could
never have won.
We offer these brief summaries of matters discussed earlier by way of
example. Our intention here is not to develop a theory of legal impact. Instead,
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we are concerned with the possibility that law may be used to enhance social
justice. Note how far we have come. We have seen that removing society from
law, as in systems of formal autonomy, is not a promising option unless society
is equal to begin with, in which case formal autonomy melts into pure autonomy
and we reach the Nirvana of maximal freedom, given the available goods, and
pure procedural justice. We have also seen that laws that aim at increased equality
can be enacted in an unequal society and enforced despite social resistance. The
possibility for an iterative progression toward complete equality exists. If the
groups on the bottom grow relatively more powerful, they should be able to
demand more in the way of further equality. They will seek laws that give them
more and a judicial system that acknowledges their interests. 30

Liberty and Equality
If the goal is social justice, however, a contradiction may arise. As you will
recall from Chapter 9, liberty is given priority over equality in Rawls' s (197 l)
scheme of justice. Equality-enhancing changes are not permitted if they infringe
on basic rights. Yet when law gets into the business of redistributing welfare it
necessarily curtails the freedom of some. Endowments are status-oriented rather
than neutral, and if the redistributive effort is to be maximally effective courts
must eschew formalism and consider the ends to be achieved by the norms they
are enforcing. A regime of substantive justice that aims for social equality is
required.
But such a regime conflicts with liberty interests. Rights in property are
diminished, for people are not free to spend their wealth as they wish. Instead,
resources are taken from some and given to others. In addition, freedom of
association might be limited. To promote fair equality of opportunity, male-only
clubs might be ordered open to women and private schools might be forced to
integrate along with public ones. Liberties enhanced by the good faith interpretation of written law are also diminished as courts respond to extra legal status
considerations.
Now these consequences might strike many as tolerable if equality would
in fact be enhanced. Indeed, Rawls's scheme would allow some of them, because
not all liberty interests are "trump" but only certain basic ones are. And one
might argue that enhancing economic equality enhances the total system of liberty
as well. But if true equality were the goal, law would have to do still more.
Free speech might have to be suppressed, at least to the extent of banning any
language that degrades any status group. People might have to be assigned to
jobs, for discrimination in the workplace can be subtle indeed. Procedural formalism would disappear from the legal process because it could interfere with

30. Repression, however, is another possibility as those on the top seek to stop the gradual erosion
of their advantages before it is too late.
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doing justice. And even the ballot might have to go, for a majority might not
vote for a regime that sought to impose equality through state action. Ultimately,
the picture one gets is not one of pursuing equality through law, but of pursuing
equality despite it. The rule of law, in other words, entails constraints on the
state. The pursuit of total equality at some point requires their elimination.
Of course, the last scenario is farfetched. The pursuit of equality is unlikely
ever to extend so far as to encompass our parade of "horribles." But this is
only because of the extreme way in which we have stated these possibilities. In
less extreme form all of them have occurred. To prevent the degradation of
women, statutes barring pornography have been passed, even though some of
the material the statutes seek to suppress has heretofore been considered protected
free speech. Quotas have led to choices between job candidates on the basis of
race. Courts have ignored or overridden established procedural rules to reach
decisions based on litigant status. And the ballot was certainly rendered meaningless for many southerners who sought policies that would forestall integration.
Some or even all of these actions may be justified, but the threats they pose to
basic liberty interests must be acknowledged.
Here we come to the inescapable dilemma. Liberty and equality, which we
take to be the two fundamental desiderata of justice, cannot be maximized
simultaneously. 31
Not only do statutes that attempt to make people more socially and economically equal threaten liberty interests, but the pursuit of more equal liberty
in the long run may also seem to call for the destruction of liberties that are
currently enjoyed. The tension between the demands of liberty and the ideal of
equality is clearly visible when we examine alternative legal systems. Formal
autonomy, which protects basic liberty, does so for much of the population only
in theory or only in part. The right to vote is not worth much if the lack of bus
fare keeps one from the polls. The right to enter into contracts is of little value

31. Rawls (1971), of course, recognizes this, for much of a Theory of Justice is devoted to the
relationship between these two goods. When equality is equality of liberty it is required, but Rawls
never adequately confronts the fact that achieving equal liberty may require that seemingly basic
liberty interests be overridden. Rawls would probably allow such overriding because he would allow
the sacrifice of some liberty for a greater, more equal liberty in the long run (pp. 247-248). However,
Rawls's discussion is ambiguous because infringing on some liberties, like liberty of conscience,
seems not to be allowed. Moreover, since one could always argue that a liberty interest was being
infringed in the interest of greater long-run liberty, unless Rawls meant his concession to apply only
where liberty interests were in immediate conflict or in a few limited circumstances, the right to
destroy liberty in the interests of long-run liberty would in actuality be a way of circumventing
liberty's priority.
When equality concerns the more material aspects of well-being, the priority of liberty is clear,
but the situation is complicated by the ways in which equality in material goods contributes to more
equal liberty. Rawls also touches on this issue in a way that is not completely satisfactory. He
suggests that some minimal level of material well-being may be necessary to enjoy basic liberties,
but the level seems truly minimal and the implications for equal liberty of the difference between
those above the minimum and those far above it are not adequately addressed. See, however, Rawls
(1982).
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if a lack of bargaining power means that one must always accept the terms
another has set. All the rights in the world may seem meaningless if one's child
has perished from a disease that adequate medical care could have prevented.
In an unequal society, formal autonomy by treating everyone as equal will place
the state's power behind arrangements that keep some people in second-class
status.
Substantive justice, on the other hand, need not be directed at increased
equality, and when it is, liberty interests are almost certain to be infringed. To
some extent such infringements will be offset by the greater ability of those who
have been aided to enjoy the liberties they have. However, as the pursuit of
equality continues, the balance is likely to shift.
The difficulty confronting those who wish to use law as an instrument of
social justice is to do so in a way that retains those aspects of formal autonomy
that guarantee valued freedoms of individual action. The task is to achieve fair
equality of opportunity, open offices, and a distribution of welfare in which the
only inequalities are those allowed by the difference principle. This requires
redistributive welfare-oriented endowments and is more likely when such laws
are interpreted by sympathetic substantively oriented courts. Yet the goal must
be accomplished without sacrificing political and moral liberty. These are protected by the legal autonomy associated with general endowments and formalism.
Ultimately, we must tum from Rawls to ourselves in order to decide on the
type of legal system we prefer. Rawls's judgment of how to value liberty and
equality is just one of many possible balances that may be struck (Hart, 1973).
We must think philosophically, for we must weigh competing values. And we
must develop law and social science, because we need more detailed knowledge
about how law relates to valued outcomes.

